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Case No. 20090084-CA
IN THE

U T A H C O U R T OF A P P E A L S

State of Utah,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.

S. Steven Maese,
Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals his convictions for one count of pattern of unlawful activity, a
second degree felony, and four counts of exploiting prostitution, third degree felonies. This
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2009).1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1(a) Did Defendant affirmatively waive any claim that the trial court's failure to rule
on his request for a bill of particulars before trial prejudiced him, where he represented on
the morning of trial that he was prepared to proceed?
1 (b) Was Defendant entitled to or prejudiced by the lack of a bill of particulars where
the information and probable cause statement detailed the elements of the offense and their
factual bases?

1

Unless otherwise noted, all citations to the code are to the 2004 West publication.

Standard of Review. The invited error doctrine precludes appellate review of this
claim. See State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 54, 70 P.3d 111.
2. Should this Court entertain Defendant's plain error challenge to the unanimity jury
instructions, where he invited any error by telling the trial court that his only objections to
the jury instructions related to another issue?
Standard of Review. The invited error doctrine precludes appellate review of this
claim. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 54.
3. Was the evidence sufficient to support Defendant's convictions for pattern of
unlawful activity and exploiting prostitution?
Standard of Review. A jury conviction will be reversed for insufficient evidence only
when, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the
verdict, the evidence is "sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt" as to the defendant's guilt." State v.
Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah 1997).
4. Should this Court entertain Defendant's claim of a variance between the
information and the jury instructions where Defendant did not object below and where he
told the trial court that his only objection to the instructions was related to another issue?
Standard of Review. The invited error doctrine also precludes appellate review of this
claim. See Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, \ 54.

2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Copies of the following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules are in
Addendum A:
Utah Const, art. I, § 10; Utah Const, art. I, § 12; Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-1; Utah
Code Ann. §§ 76-10-1301,1302,1304,1305; Utah Code Ann. §§76-10-1602,1603; Utah R.
Crim. P. 4; Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e); Utah R. Evid. 606(b).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant and Tiffany Curtis were charged by amended information with one count
of pattern of unlawful activity, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 7610-1603; four counts of exploiting prostitution, third degree felonies, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-1305; and one count of money laundering, a second degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1903. R8-13.
The accompanying probable cause statement alleged that Defendant and Ms. Curtis,
as co-owners of an escort agency—the Doll House—engaged in and received proceeds from
aiding and encouraging prostitution. Rl 1. According to the probable cause statement, a
search of the Doll House's place of business yielded documents showing that the agency was
an unlicensed, sexually-oriented business. Id. The probable cause statement also alleged
that the Doll House's website contained a link to "theeroticreview.com," where patrons
could post reviews of escorts. Id. The police "discovered hundreds of reviews" on that site,
"describing] specific sexual acts that Doll House escorts have performed." Id.

3

The probable cause statement further alleged that police had interviewed several
current and past Doll House escorts, who described "an ongoing pattern by which
[Defendant] and Curtis aided and encouraged prostitution, and received the proceeds from
the appointments." Id. The probable cause statement then summarized the statements of
seven of the interviewed escorts. Rl 1-13. Six of the summaries placed the defendants'
alleged activities within a range of two to five months. Id. One escort described the
defendants' pattern of activity over the course of a year. R13.
After a preliminary hearing at which an investigating officer and three of the escorts
testified, Defendant and Ms. Curtis were bound over as charged. R40-41; see generally R81;
R81:138.
About five months before trial, Ms. Curtis negotiated a plea agreement in which she
pled guilty to two class A misdemeanor counts of attempted exploitation of prostitution.
R319:74-75.

The plea agreement did not require Ms. Curtis to cooperate with the

prosecution or testify against Defendant. R319:75. Ms. Curtis later agreed to talk to police,
and she testified against Defendant at trial. R319:75-77.
Before trial, Defendant requested and received extensive discovery, including the
recordings of police interviews with Ms. Curtis and the escort witnesses. R191-92,452-53,
720.
A jury acquitted Defendant of the money laundering charge, but convicted him on all
other counts. R313-14. The trial court denied Defendant's subsequent motion to arrest

4

judgment. R696-733. The court suspended the applicable statutory prison terms in favor of
60 days in jail and 36 months'probation. R808-10. Defendant timely appealed. R821.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant and Tiffany Curtis co-owned and operated an escort agency that required
their escorts to get naked on every date. Defendant encouraged the escorts to perform sex
acts for money, and he posted reviews on the Internet detailing the sex acts his escorts had"
previously perfonned. The following details are presented in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict. See State v. Loose, 2000 UT 11, \ 2, 994 P.2d 1237.
The Doll House
Defendant, a former bank employee, was unemployed when he met and started dating
Tiffany Curtis. R319:69-70;R320:258. Ms. Curtis was interested in buying the escort
agency that she worked for and asked Defendant to review the agency's profits and losses.
R319:70,107;R320:259-61. After Defendant determined they could start their own escort
agency for much less, the two formed the Doll House. R319:69-70,110; R320:262.
Defendant brought his business and marketing expertise to the partnership, while Ms. Curtis
brought her knowledge of the escort industry. R319:70,109,111-12; R320:262-63.
Defendant and Ms. Curtis consulted an attorney on how to run a legal escort business.
R319:72; R320:263-66. The attorney gave them a packet and advised them what sexual
activity was and was not legal. R319:72,266. Ms. Curtis told Defendant that she had made
good money as an escort without performing any illegal sex acts. R319:109; R320:266-67.

5

But they did not "really talk about" how to run the Doll House without any illegal activity.
R319:108.
The two obtained a sexually oriented business license from Park City, because Ms.
Curtis knew from her escort experience that Park City had more lenient nudity laws.
R319:3,70,79,110-ll;R320:263-65. They leased an office in Park City, but did no actual
business there. Rather, they ran the Doll House from Ms. Curtis's home in Cottonwood
Heights. R 319:7-25,79; R320:264-65.
Marketing Differentiation
The Doll House's biggest competitor charged $150.00 just for an escort to show up.
R3 20:274. The client would have to pay more if he wanted the escort to take off her clothes
or provide other services. R320:270. For "marketing differentiation," the Doll House
charged a $145.00 set fee for the escort to show up and "get naked." R320:270-71.
Of that fee, $95.00 went to the agency and $50.00 to the escort. R319:88, 105,135,
148, 182, 221; R320:275. But the escort could then earn "tips" by providing additional
services, such as body massages, lap dances, shower shows, dirty talk, or sex acts, including
masturbation, oral sex, and full intercourse. R319:104-06, 148-49; R320:182-83,267.
The escort negotiated the amount of tips she received, based on "[w]hat the gentleman
wanted to do," R320:149,160, and how much she wanted for each act. R320:149,241. The
tips belonged to the escort, although Ms. Curtis and Defendant strongly encouraged the
escorts to share 10 to 20 per cent of their tips with the "phone girl," who set up the
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appointment. R 320:222;State's Ex. 29 at 5. The phone girl was almost always Ms. Curtis.
R319:89,111-12,136; R320:222,182. The larger the tip an escort gave to Ms. Curtis, the
more appointments she received. R319:149-50;R320:182; State's Ex. 29 at 5.
Interviewing and hiring
Defendant and Ms. Curtis normally interviewed and hired escorts together. R319:72,
79-80,269-70. They had a "canned script" and told "every single girl that you're required
to get naked on every single appointment." R320:270; R319:126; R320:146, 159, 181;
State's Ex. 29 at 4. At first, Defendant and Ms. Curtis told potential escorts what sexual
activity they legally "could and couldn't do" on an appointment. R319:72, 80. But after six
to eight months, they "just stopped talking about" the "legalities" during hiring interviews.
R319:73. They "didn't want to freak anybody out," by making potential escorts "think that
these guys were going to be aggressive with them." R319:73. They also wanted new escorts
"to be open to possibilities within the appointment itself," meaning that they did not want
new escorts to think "the company" would "come down on them" if they were "to have sex
on an appointment." R319:73-74.
Not all the Doll House escorts "prostituted themselves." R319:86. But the Doll
House benefited from those who did. R319:86. Defendant and Ms. Curtis frequently used
the terms "play ball" or "bailers" to describe girls who would have sex with a client.
R319:87. New hires were often sent to regular clients on their first appointments to "find out
if they were up to prostitution or not." R319:86. One escort—Heather W.—was told that
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she had been sent on some appomtments because Doll House management knew that she
would have sex with a client "for the right amount." R320:220.
Policy and Procedures
Defendant, with the help of Ms. Curtis, wrote a policy and procedures manual, which
they gave to each escort upon being hired. R319:81-82; R320:298; State's Ex. 29. The
manual set forth the fee structure, dress code, and appointment requirements. State's Ex. 29.
Escorts were required to "dress in a skirt/dress and heels on all jobs," arrive on time, have "a
positive andfriendly attitude," and become "fully nude" where allowed by law. State's Ex.
29, at 3-4. They were also required to "[ejntertain the client for afullfifty (50) minutes" and
could be fined if they left an appointment early "without permission." Id. at 4, 6 The
manual neither required nor prohibited sex acts. State's Ex. 29; R319:81-82.
Doll House proceeds
The escorts always collected the $145 appointment fee upfront. R320:148,169,175,
241, 274; State's Ex. 29 at 5-6. As soon as the appointment ended, they returned to Ms.
Curtis's residence where they turned in the $95.00 agency fee and any tips for the phone girl.
R319:95, 124; R320:212; State's Ex. 29 at 6. Defendant was almost always there, counting
money. R 319:95, 124. On one occasion, Defendant was "really excited" because he had
collected $5,000 so far that day. R319:124. One escort noticed that the $95.00 agency fee
and tips for the phone girl were placed in the same bag as the agency fees. R320:226-27.
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Defendant used money collected by the escorts to pay for phones, advertising,
utilities, and photography equipment. R319:19-36, 112, 136; R320:269, 279-80, 305-07;
State's Exs. 20,21,22, 23,27. Doll House financial records showed money transfers from
the Doll House to Defendant's personal bank account. R319:27-33.
Advertising
Defendant, as the managing partner, was in charge of advertising. R320:307. He
explained that the success of the Doll House was "all about the advertising, it's all about
what you can communicate to the public."

R320:269.

Defendant and Ms. Curtis

"plaster[ed] their phone number everywhere," and advertised in many different publications
and on the Internet. R320:273; R319:21.
Defendant also set up a website for the Doll House on which he posted photographs
that he had taken of the escorts. R319:14-15, 95, 122, 164, 307. He photographed the
escorts wearing "sexy clothing, lingerie, underwear." R319:122. One escort described the
poses, as "very, you know, sex poses." R319:122.
The Erotic Review
Defendant placed a link in the upper right-hand corner of the Doll House website to
The Erotic Review. R319:16, 83;R320:308-10. The Erotic Review is a nationwide website
where people post reviews of various erotic services, such as escorts, massages, strip clubs,
or gentlemen's clubs. R319:16, 82-83.
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According to Ms. Curtis, The Erotic Review "will make or break an [escort] agency in
Utah." R319:83. It is "the primary source . . . to get your name out there, the Doll House
and any particular girl who worked there." R319:83.
Defendant and Ms. Curtis regularly checked The Erotic Review to see what was being
said about their escorts. R319:83-85; R320:125-27, 308-11. Some of the reviews said that
Doll House escorts had engaged in unlawful sexual activity. R320:310-12. Poor reviews
were "bad" for business and affected the Doll House's income. R319:85. Defendant and
Ms. Curtis printed out some of the reviews to show the escorts at company meetings.
R319:1145125-26. They talked about "what was good and what was bad." R319:114,12526. A bad review included a "girl talking on her cell phone with her boyfriend, a girl
refusing to be nice,... refusing to get naked . . . refusing to have sex . . . . " R319:114-15.
Defendant and Ms. Curtis wrote some reviews themselves and posted them on The
Erotic Review. R319:116-17. All the reviews said that the escort would engage in sexual
activity. R319:116-17. "[T]here was no other point in writing [them]," Ms. Curtis
explained. R319:117.
Doll House escorts engaged in sex acts for money
Six escorts testified at trial that they regularly engaged in sex acts—i.e., masturbation,
oral sex, or sexual intercourse—for money on appointments set up by the Doll House.
R319:125;R320:125,150,167,183,211,240. Escorts were generally expected to work 40
to 50 hours per week. R319:129; R320:150-51; State's Ex. 29 at 4. Some escorts had as
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many as three to four appointments a day, or fifteen to twenty in a week. R319:123;
R320:151. One escort testified that she engaged in sex acts in about one-third of her
appointments, R320:167; two testified that they engaged in sex acts on about half their
appointments, R319:125; R320:150; one testified that she engaged in sex acts between 60
and 70 per cent of the time, R320:183; and one testified that she engaged in sex acts on all of
her appointments, R320:240.
Defendant encouraged Doll House escorts to engage in
sex acts for money and discouraged them from quitting the business
Defendant knew that Doll House escorts were engaging in sex acts for money,
because he discussed with them what they did on appointments and how much they were
paid. R319:87-88, 103; R320:186-88, 235-36 . He encouraged them to engage in sex acts
for less money and, when they wanted to quit the business, he discouraged them from doing
so. RR319:126-27, 128-32; R320:160, 186, 234-46, 237-38. Witnesses testified to the
following specific examples.
The bachelor party. In early 2005, Defendant went to a bachelor party with two Doll
House escorts. R319:97. Defendant called Ms. Curtis from the party to say that "they were
in and [had] collected" the fee. Id. After the party, Defendant returned the two escorts to
Ms. Curtis's home, where he showed Ms. Curtis photos he had taken of the bachelor's
"below average penis size" and of the two escorts performing oral sex on each other with
jam or jelly. Id.
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Not just a lap dance. Defendant once drove an escort to a hotel for an appointment,
because he could get her there much faster than if she drove herself. R320:233-34.
Defendant told her that she was going to see "a regular," and that "this is not just a lap dance
or dancing or anything." Id. The escort understood this to mean that the appointment would
involve "[sjexual stuff." Id. As the escort got out of the car, Defendant told her that this
client usually gave around a $400.00 tip. Id.
Inside, the client handed the escort $400 and "expected [her] to do everything, like
sexual intercourse and everything." The escort "had a problem with that" because she
normally charged $800 for intercourse and $400 for just "a hand job." The escort ultimately
"stripp[ed] down," "rub[ed] [her] butt on his dick," and gave him oral sex. R320:235.
When Defendant picked the escort up, he asked what she did for the $400. Id. When
she told him that she "basically jacked him off and gave him a blow job," Defendant told her
that she "need[ed] to be a little more liberal than that" for $400. R320:235-36.
Calling escorts. While Ms. Curtis answered the phone, she sometimes had Defendant
call the escorts to send them to their appointments. R320:326-37. Defendant berated one
escort for being late to two appointments in one night. R320:237. When that escort declined
an appointment a few weeks later, Defendant called her and wanted to know why.
R320:238. The escort said she thought she was fired; Defendant replied, "You would know
if you were fired." R320:238. The escort then took the appointment, but testified that she
would not have if Defendant had not called her back. R320:239.
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Charging too much. One escort complained to Defendant that other escorts were
charging too little to have sex with clients, which made clients reluctant to pay her asking
price of $300 to $1,000. R319:103; R320:187-88. Defendant told her that she was not worth
$300. R319:103;R320:187-88.
Make the guy happy. Defendant encouraged the escorts in company meetings to
"work harder," "get good reviews," and "make people happy"; the escorts understood this to
mean that they should provide sex acts for less money than other escort agencies. R319:12627; R320:160. Defendant told one escort, during a dispute with a "regular" client over the
fee for sexual intercourse, to go to a gas station, buy condoms, and go back and "make the
guy happy." R320:186.
A letter to an escort's parents. When a top earning escort wanted to quit, Defendant
left her about five voicemail and text messages, in which he first offered to help her work
things out, but then threatened that he would "be forced to take some measures" against her
if she did not call him back. R319:128-32. Defendant warned that she "wouldn't be happy
about what was going to go on." R319:128-32. The escort never called Defendant back.
R319:132. .
About six months later, Defendant drafted and sent an anonymous letter to the
escort's parents calling her a "whore" and detailing the kinds of sexual activities she had
engaged in both while a Doll House escort and afterwards. R319:99-100, 132-34; State's
Ex. 30. Defendant enclosed photos of the escort from her My Space page, another escort
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agency's website, and the Doll House website. Defendant also enclosed the escort's reviews
from The Erotic Review. R319:100, 132-34; State's Ex. 30.
The Defense
Defendant testified that he and Ms. Curtis always told the escorts that they could not
legally engage in sexual activity on an appointment. R320:281-82. He denied that either he
or the Doll House received any proceeds from the tips that the escorts paid Ms. Curtis.
R320:277-78, 293. He also denied receiving money that he understood to have come from
escorts performing sex acts on other people. R320:293. According to Defendant, the only
money he received was strictly from "escorting activity," i.e., "they showed up, they got
naked and they spent an hour with the customer." 320:293.
Defendant denied encouraging any Doll House employee to commit sex acts.
R320:293-94. He also denied knowingly driving any escort to a location where a sex act was
committed, although he admitted to occasionally driving them to appointments. R320:294.
On direct examination, Defendant claimed that he had never learned of nor had any
knowledge that sex acts were committed by any Doll House employees. R320:294. On
cross-examination, however, he admitted that he had read erotic reviews on his escorts
stating that they had committed sex acts. R320:310-11. He claimed that such conduct would
initially result in a "verbal rebuke," and that he fired "probably two or three" escorts for
engaging in illegal sexual activity. R320:312.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the trial court's failure to
compel a bill of particulars before trial. The invited error doctrine forecloses appellate
review of this issue, where defense counsel affirmatively represented to the trial court that he
was ready to proceed to trial, even though he had not yet received a bill of particulars. In any
event, Defendant has not shown that he was entitled to a bill of particulars where the
information and two-page probable cause statement detailed the elements and factual bases
of the charged offenses. Defendant also has not made a credible showing that his defense
would have been different if he had received a bill of particulars.
Point II: Defendant argues that the jury instructions failed to ensure that the jury
turned a unanimous verdict. Defendant acknowledges that he did not raise this challenge
below; he therefore asks this Court to review the unanimity instructions for plain error.
But the invited error doctrine also precludes appellate review of this claim. It is wellsettled in Utah that a party may not obtain even plain error review of alleged instruction error
when that party affimiatively told the trial court that he had no objections to the challenged
instructions. Here, defense counsel raised only one, unrelated challenge to the jury
instructions. He then told the trial court that he had nothing further. And when the jury later
sent a question to the trial court about the instructions, defense counsel argued that the
instructions were "adequate," and that the jury should simply be told to re-read the
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instructions. Those representations amounted to invited error. But even if Defendant were
entitled to plain error review, he has not shown obvious, prejudicial error.
Point III: Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
convictions. This Court should decline to reach his challenge because he has not marshaled
the evidence. In any event, as the trial found, a "mountain of evidence" supported the
convictions for four counts of exploiting prostitution and one count of pattern of unlawful
activity.
Point IV: Defendant argues that the elements instruction for pattern of unlawful
activity created a fatal variance with the information, because it permitted the jury to find
him guilty on a statutory alternative that was not charged in the information. Again, the
invited error doctrine precludes appellate review of this claim. As explained, Defendant
affirmatively stated that he had no objections to the instructions, other than on one unrelated
matter. In any event, Defendant has shown no prejudice.
ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT AFFIRMATIVELY WAIVED ANY CLAIM THAT HE
WAS PREJUDICED BY THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO RULE
ON HIS REQUEST FOR A BILL OF PARTICULARS BEFORE
TRIAL; IN ANY EVENT, DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO,
OR PREJUDICED BY THE LACK OF, A BILL OF A PARTICULARS
Background
About 45 days before trial, defense counsel moved for a bill of particulars
"specifically identifying the factual information the State intends to rely upon in the
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prosecution of Counts II, III, IV, and V," the exploitation of prostitution counts. R167, 332.
The motion did not ask for any other information, nor did it seek a bill of particulars on the
unlawful pattern of illegal activity or money laundering charges. R167. The State filed a
timely opposing memorandum, arguing that Defendant had already received specific factual
information regarding the place, date, and time of the offenses, "as known by the
prosecution," through the information, probable cause statement, preliminary hearing, and
extensive pretrial discovery. Rl 69-71. In his reply, filed one week before trial, Defendant
contended that he lacked notice because it was impossible to reconcile the evidence with the
individual charges. Rl 86-87.
Three days before trial, the trial court held argument on the request for the bill of
particulars and Defendant's motion to disqualify the entire prosecutor's office. See R717.
The court promised to issue a written decision on the pending motions before trial began.2
R332,717. The court issued a written decision the same day denying Defendant's motion to
disqualify the prosecutor's office, but not mentioning the motion for a bill of particulars.
R203-09.
On the morning of trial, defense counsel did not ask the trial court for a ruling on his
motion for a bill of particulars, nor did he otherwise direct the court's attention to the fact

Defendant did not have that hearing transcribed, and the minute entry for the hearing
does not note that argument was had on this or any other motion. Rl97-98. However, both
Defendant's motion to arrest judgment and the trial court's ruling denying that motion agree
that the trial court held oral argument on the motions and promised to rule on the motions
before trial. R332-33; R716-18. See also Br. Aplt. 8-9, 25-30.
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that it had not yet issued a ruling on that request. R717-19. Instead, when asked whether he
was ready to proceed, Defendant said that he was.3 R717-18.
After the jury returned a guilty verdict, defense counsel moved to arrest judgment,
pointing out for the first time that the trial court had not ruled on his motion for a bill of
particulars. R332. He asserted that he "depended on this ruling in order to adequately
prepare [a] defense." R334. He claimed that if the trial court had denied the motion, he was
"prepared to seek an interlocutory appeal," and that if the motion had been granted, he
"would have designed a defense in relation to the specific act or acts alleged." R334.
Counsel argued that it was too late for the trial court to go back and rule on the motion for
the bill, and that Defendant was therefore automatically entitled to a new trial. R334-35. He
alternatively argued that the lack of a bill of a particulars denied Defendant adequate notice
to prepare a defense. R336-42.
The trial court found that Defendant waived any right to a ruling when, instead of
asking for the ruling, he told the trial court he was ready to try the case. R718. The trial
court also concluded that Defendant was not harmed where the information and probable
cause statement had given him sufficient notice of the charges against him. R721-26. (A
copy of the court's ruling is in Addendum B).
3

This exchange does not appear in the partial transcripts included in the record on
appeal. See R83 8:3; R319:1. The trial court, however, relates this exchange in its denial of
Defendant's motion for arrest of judgment. R718. Defendant also agrees that "the trial
court asked both litigants if they were ready to proceed with trial" and that "[b]oth parties
answered affirmatively." Br. Aplt. 28.
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On appeal, Defendant again faults the trial court for not ruling on his request for a bill
of particulars before trial. Br. Aplt. 25-29. He takes issue with the trial court's finding that
he waived any right he may have had to a ruling. Br. Aplt. 28-29. He contends that he was
prejudiced by the lack of a bill of particulars because the information and probable cause
statement did not give him sufficient factual detail to adequately prepare a defense. Br. Aplt.
19-25.
Defendant invited any error with respect to the trial court's failure to rule on the bill
of particulars motion. He thus affirmatively waived any claim that he lacked notice or was
prejudiced by the lack of a bill. In any event, as found by the trial court, Defendant was
neither entitled to a bill nor prejudiced by its absence, because the information and probable
cause statement sufficiently detailed the charges.
A. Defendant invited any error and therefore affirmatively waived any claim
that he was entitled to, or prejudiced by the lack of, a bill of particulars.
This Court should not address Defendant's claim that he was prejudiced by the trial
court's failure to rule on or compel a bill of particulars because he invited any error.
1. Invited error or affirmative waiver precludes appellate review.
To obtain appellate review, a party ordinarily must first raise the issue in the trial
court. Pratt v.Nelson, 2007 UT 41, ^[ 15, 164P.3d366. To preserve an issue for appeal, the
objection must be timely, specific, and supported by evidence or relevant legal authority. Id.
This rule is "based on the premise that, 'in the interest of orderly procedure, the trial court
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ought to be given an opportunity to address a claimed error and, if appropriate, correct it.'"
Id. (quoting State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, \ 33, 122 P.3d 543). While an appellate court may
review an unpreserved claim for plain error or manifest injustice, it will do so only if the
appellant argues that plain error or exceptional circumstances justifies review. Id. at ^ 16.
But the Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that an affirmative waiver—or
invited error—precludes even plain error review. See Pratt, 2007 UT 41, \ 16; State v.
Winfield, 2006 UT 4, Tf 14, 128 P.3d 1171); State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 54, 70 P.3d
111; State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, ^ 9, 86 P.3d 742. A party has committed invited
error when counsel, "either by statement or act affirmatively represented to the [trial] court
that he or she had no objection to the [proceedings]." Pratt, 2007 UT 41, f 16 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted).
The affirmative waiver or invited error doctrine "arises from the principle that a party
cannot take advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into
committing the error." Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^f 15. It recognizes that parties are "not entitled
to both the benefit of not objecting at trial and the benefit of objecting at trial," and it
discourages parties "from intentionally misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden
ground for reversal on appeal." Pratt, 2007 UT 41, f 17 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). It is "designed to . . . inhibit a defendant from foregoing... an objection
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with the strategy of enhancing the defendant's chances of acquittal and then, if that strategy
fails,.. . claiming on appeal that the court should reverse."4 King, 2006 UT 3, ^ 13.
2. Defendant affirmatively waived or invited any error when he told the
trial court that he was ready to proceed to trial.
Although Defendant initially raised his bill of particulars claim in the trial court by
moving for a bill, that did not preserve the issue for appellate review.

Defendant

subsequently led the trial court into the error he now advances on appeal by affirmatively
stating on the morning of trial that he was ready to proceed, even though the trial court had
not yet ruled on his motion for a bill of particulars. R718.
Defendant claimed in his motion to arrest judgment that he "depended on" the trial
court's ruling "to adequately prepare his defense." R334. He asserted, for the first time, that
if the trial court had denied the motion, he was "prepared to seek an interlocutory appeal,"

A trial court may sometimes cure a defendant's failure to timely raise claims of error
at trial by reaching the merits of those claims in a post-judgment motion, such as a motion to
arrest judgment. See State v. Belgard, 830 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1992) (per curiam) ("trial
court in effect reopened the trial when it held an evidentiary hearing" after a bench trial);
State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 1053 (Utah 1991) (same with jury trial). The principle
underlying those cases is that the trial court "'chose not to treat the defendant's failure to
raise the issue . . . as a waiver.'" Belgard, 830 P.2d at 265-66 (quoting Matsamas, 808 P.2d
at 1053). Those cases do not apply to this issue, because the trial court here treated this
claim as waived. See R718. Those cases, which involved only simple waiver, also do not
apply to the type of invited error presented in this case. It would gut the invited error
doctrine to permit a defendant to purposefully sow error and to cure that error simply by
raising the issue in a post-trial motion. See State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1285 (invited
error doctrine precludes defendant from inviting prejudicial error and then implanting it in
the record "as a form of appellate insurance"). But see State v. Beeson, 2000 UT App 109, Tf
12-15, 2 P.3d 459 (applying Belgard to cure invited error by appellant, but not addressing
whether Belgard should apply in such cases).
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and that if the trial court had granted the motion, he "would have designed a defense in
relation to the specific act or acts alleged." R334.
The time to point out that he needed the bill of particulars to adequately prepare a
defense, however, was before trial began, not after the jury had rendered a guilty verdict.
Defendant knew before trial whether he needed a bill to adequately prepare a defense. Yet,
instead of reminding the trial court of his pending motion, Defendant told the court that he
was ready for trial. That statement affirmatively represented to the court that Defendant, in
fact, did have sufficient notice to adequately prepare a defense and that a bill of particulars
was unnecessary. It also deprived the trial court of an opportunity to avoid any error or
prejudice to Defendant. See Cruz, 2005 UT 45, % 33 (trial court ought to be given first
opportunity to address, and if necessary, correct a claimed error). Only after the jury
returned its guilty verdict did Defendant shift strategies, claiming that a bill of particulars
was so critical to his defense that he was prepared to seek interlocutory review, if necessary.
Thus, the record here suggests that Defendant purposefully forwent an objection to
implant an error in the record "as a form of appellate insurance." Parsons, 781 P.2d at 1285.
After allowing trial to proceed without a ruling on the bill of particulars, Defendant argued in
his motion to arrest judgment that the trial court's failure to rule on the motion alone entitled
him to a new trial. See R332-35. Defendant repeats that argument on appeal, asserting that

22

it is too late for the trial court to go back and rule on the issue and that he is entitled to
automatic reversal and a new trial.5 See Br. Aplt. 25-28.
Defendant's invited error is comparable to that in State v. Lowder, 483 P.2d 886, 887
(Utah 1971). There, Lowder asked for, and the trial court ordered, a bill of particulars. Id.
at 886. But the prosecution delayed providing the bill until the Friday before the Monday
trial was to begin. Id. The morning of trial, Lowder's counsel complained that he had "too
little time to prepare his defense after the Bill was furnished." Counsel thought he was
entitled to a continuance, but he declined one because his client "was anxious to have the
matter out of the way." Id.
On appeal, Lowder argued that the State's failure to timely furnish a bill of particulars
should have resulted in dismissing the charges. Id. at 887. The Utah Supreme Court
answered Lowder's claims by finding "an obvious waiver of such right by defendant's
failure to ask for a continuance." Id. The Court also noted that Lowder "apparently
considered the statement [provided in the bill of particulars] of little consequence, else he
would have asked for the continuance which he waived." Id. The Court concluded that
Lowder could not "invite error by such procedure." Id.
5

The State does not agree that a trial court is precluded from going back and
explaining its reasons for the denial of a motion, even when that denial is the practical result
of the trial court's failing to rule before trial. As the trial court noted below, State v.
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 778 (Utah 1991), on which Defendant's argument depends, involved
an entirely different circumstance and is inapplicable here. R722-23. Defendant's argument
on this point, however, places in stark relief the policy considerations underlying the invited
error doctrine.
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This case, like Lowder, presents the precise scenario that the invited error doctrine is
designed to prevent—a defendant seeking "both the benefit of not objecting at trial and the
benefit of objecting at trial." King, 2006 UT 3, ^} 13. Had the bill of particulars in fact been
critical to his defense, Defendant would have alerted the trial court to its failure to rule on his
motion before trial and sought a continuance. He should not be permitted to benefit from
misleading the trial court into thinking that he had adequate notice and was prepared to go to
trial without the bill of particulars.6

6

Defendant challenges the trial court's waiver finding as a misinterpretation of rule
12(f), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that a defendant's failure to timely
raise defenses, objections, or pretrial requests constitutes a "waiver thereof." Br. Aplt. 2829. Whether or not Defendant waived his rights to a ruling under rule 12(f) is irrelevant
given that he invited any error by stating that he was ready for trial.
Defendant also contends that his affirmative response to "a general and customary
'readiness' question" should not amount to waiver. Br. Aplt. 29. He cites no support for that
assertion. Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court has held that an affirmative response to a similar
"general and customary" question—"do you pass the jury for cause"—amounts to an
affirmative waiver of claimed errors injury selection. Winfield, 2006 UT 4, ^ 1, 17-18.
Finally, Defendant asserts that he has "no affirmative obligation to, and moreover
cannot, compel the trial court to rule." Br. Aplt. 29. While a party may not be able to
"compel" a trial court to rule, nothing in this record suggests that the trial court needed
compelling. Rather, it appears that the trial court's failure to rule on the motion was merely
an oversight. If, as Defendant now contends, he truly was not ready to proceed without a bill
of particulars, it behooved him to inform the trial court of that fact instead of waiting until it
was too late to correct any alleged harm. Criminal trials are not "sporting events." Medel v.
State, 2008 UT 32, ^f 54,184 P.3d 1226. Thus, the defense, like the prosecution, bears some
responsibility in ensuring that the criminal process is fair. See State v. Baker, 935 P.2d 503,
506-07 (Utah 1997) ("all parties, including the defense have a duty not to sow error," and "to
help ensure a, fair trial").
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B. Defendant was not entitled to a bill of particulars where he was sufficiently
apprised of the particulars of the charges to adequately prepare a defense.
Even if Defendant had not invited error, he suffered no harm from the lack of a ruling
on his motion, because he was sufficiently apprised of the particulars of the exploitation of
prostitution counts to adequately prepare a defense.
1. An accused is entitled to a bill of particulars only when he is not
sufficiently apprised of the particulars of the charge to adequately
prepare a defense.
Article I, section 12, of the Utah Constitution grants an accused "the right . . . to
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, [and] to have a copy thereof."
The right to adequate notice under this provision "requires the prosecution to state the charge
with sufficient specificity to protect the defendant from multiple prosecutions for the same
crime and to give notice sufficient for the one charged to prepare a defense." State v. Wilcox,
808P.2d 1028,1032(Utah 1991). Defendant does not claim that any lack of specificity here
will subject him to multiple prosecutions for the same crime. He argues only that lack of
factual specificity prevented him from adequately preparing a defense. See Br. Aplt. 17-31.
If an information or indictment does not provide the notice guaranteed by article I,
section 12, the accused may ask for a bill of particulars under rule 4(e) or Utah Code Ann. §
77-14-1. Wilcox, 808 P.2d at 1031. But an accused is "entitled to a bill of particulars 'only
when the information or indictment is constitutionally deficient by reason of its failure to
inform of the nature and cause of the offense charged.'" State v. Bernards, 2007 UT App
238, Tj 15, 166 P.3d 626 (quoting State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 298 (Utah 1992)).
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The constitutional notice requirement is "designed to give those charged sufficient
notice to prepare a defense." State v. Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7,f 27,106P.3d734. "Beyond
requiring a statement of the elements of the offense, however, the test for notice has few
rules." State v. Taylor, 2005 UT 4 0 4 9,116 P-3d 360. For example, it does not require the
"exact date when an alleged offense occurred."

Id.

Moreover, the "particularity

requirement" is limited to "the 'best information' the prosecution has . . . that may be useful
in helping to fix a date, time or place of the alleged offense.'" Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, ^f 27
(quoting State v. Robbins, 709 P.2d 771, 773 (Utah 1985)). See also Wilcox, 808 P.2d at
1032 n.l.
But the particularity requirement is "'not a device to enable defendants to obtain a
preview of the prosecution's evidence.'" Gulbransen, 2005 UT 7, ^f 27 (quoting Robbins,
709 P.2d at 773). It neither requires "the prosecution to disclose all the evidence which may
be introduced at trial," nor "to disclose the exact theory upon which it intends to proceed."
State v. Allen, 839 P.2d 291, 298 (Utah 1992). Rather, the particularity requirement is
"merely designed to give those charged sufficient notice to prepare a defense." Id.
And, "so long as the elements of the crimes are covered by the factual allegations and
the defendant is fully apprised of the state's information regarding the time, place, and date
of the crimes, any lack of factual specificity goes not to the constitutional adequacy of the
notice, but to the credibility of the State's case." Wilcox, 808 P.2d at 1033 (citing State v.
Fulton, 742 P.2d 1208,1213 n.6 (Utah 1987). Thus, "[a]s long as a defendant is sufficiently

26

apprised of the State's evidence upon which the charge is based so that the defendant can
prepare to meet that case, the constitutional requirement is fulfilled." Wilcox, 808 P.2d at
1032 n.l. See also State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 105 (Utah 1988) (the "ultimate test" of
adequacy of notice is whether accused is able to prepare a defense).
2. Defendant was sufficiently apprised of the particulars of the charges
against him to adequately prepare his defense.
As a threshold matter, Defendant's request for a bill of particulars below, and his
arguments on appeal, challenge the adequacy of notice only as to the four exploitation of
prostitution counts. R167; Br. Aplt. 17-31. Thus, the question here is whether Defendant
was "sufficiently apprised of the particulars of [those] chargefs] to be able to 'adequately
prepare his defense.'" Wilcox, 808 P.2d at 1031 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). He was.
First, the information and probable cause statement together fully informed Defendant
of the "nature and cause of the offense[s] charged," Bernards, 2007 UT App 238, f 15, and
gave him "sufficient information regarding the time, place, and date of the crimes" to
adequately prepare a defense. Wilcox, 808 P.2d at 1033.
Counts II through V alleged that between July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006,
Defendant and Tiffany Curtis, "as parties to the offense," committed exploitation of
prostitution, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(1). R9-10. Each count then set
forth the following alternative elements of exploiting prostitution as found in the statute:
Defendant and Curtis (1) "owned, controlled, managed, supervised, or otherwise kept, alone
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or in association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business"; or (2)
"procured an inmate for a house of prostitution or placed one who would be an inmate in a
house of prostitution"; or (3) "encouraged, induced or otherwise purposely caused another to
become or remain a prostitute"; or (4) "transported, procured, or paid for transportation of a
person into or within this state with a purpose to promote that person's engaging in
prostitution"; or (5) "not being a child or legal dependent of a prostitute, shared the proceeds
of prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to an understanding that she was to share therein."
R9-10. (A copy of the amended information and probable cause statement is in Addendum
B).
The probable cause statement exceeded two pages. It set forth the following facts in
support of the elements of exploiting prostitution:
• Defendant and Curtis were the registered co-owners of the Doll House, an escort
agency and sexually oriented business, licensed in Park City, but run from a
Cottonwood Heights address in Salt Lake County. Rl 1.
• The Doll House website had a link to "theeroticreview.com" ("TER"), "a website
that gives reviews of escorts, written by patrons." The investigating officer
"discovered hundreds of reviews on TER which describe specific sexual acts Doll
House escorts have performed." Rl 1.
The probable cause statement then summarized the statements of seven escorts, each
identified by initials, in a "non-exhaustive description of [Defendant's] and Curtis'
activities":
•
N.F. reported that between July and September 2005, Defendant identified
"regular" customers and their likes, "such as oral sex." N.F. reported that Defendant
once ordered her to an appointment where the customer wanted sex. When the
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customer called to complain that she would not have sex, Defendant told N.F.,
"B*tch, you're gonna have to make it work." N.F. said that she was not given many
appointments because she would not have sex with clients and that when she tried to
leave the Doll House, Defendant "threatened" her. Rl 1.
•
A.F. reported that she worked as a Doll House escort between October and
December 2005 and that Defendant threatened her if she did not continue working
there. According to A.F., Curtis regularly encouraged good reviews on TER and
specifically encouraged "bbbj," a term "for oral sex without a condom." R12.
• H.T. reported that as a Doll House escort from January to March 2006, she had
sex with clients for money, and that she always paid Curtis at the Cottonwood address
following appointments. She reported that for the first four appointments, the entire
$145.00 agency fee went to the Doll House, plus 20% of any tips.
• H.R. stated that as a Doll House escort between September 2005 and February
2006, she had intercourse with clients for money, in addition to manual or oral sex.
She said that Defendant and Curtis told her that if she was ever arrested for
prostitution, to keep quiet, and they would get her a lawyer. R12.
• J.H., a Doll House escort between November and December 2005, stated that she
had sex with men for money and that she paid money out to Curtis and Defendant at
the Cottonwood address each time. J.H. also paid Curtis 20% of J.H.'s tips. On one
date, J.H. received $1,000 for having sex. She paid $100 to the Doll House as an
agency fee and gave Curtis a $200 tip. Defendant told J.H. that they would pay for a
lawyer if she would not talk to police. R12.
• D.T., a Doll House escort between April and May 2006, had as many as three to
four dates a day and had sex for money. On one date, D.T. refused to have sexual
intercourse with one customer without a condom. The customer called Defendant to
complain and Defendant told D.T. "to drive down the hill and get condoms and go
back and 'work something out.'" R12.
• T.N., a Doll House escort for about a year between 2005 and 2006, reported that
the escorts "frequently told" both Curtis and Defendant of the specific sex acts they
performed. She also said the escorts were required to give 20% of their tips to the
call girl who set the appointment, usually Curtis. Curtis frequently sent T.N. on
appointments when a customer wanted a specific sex act that the other escorts were
not willing to perform. R12.
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The information and detailed factual allegations in the probable cause statement gave
more than sufficient notice to Defendant of "the nature and cause" of the four exploitation of
prostitution charges against him.
First, the probable cause statement told Defendant that he was charged with
exploitation of prostitution because he, along with Curtis, "owned, controlled, managed,
supervised, or otherwise kept, alone or in association with another, a house of prostitution or
a prostitution business." R9-10. See a/so Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1306(l)(e). Supporting
facts included that Defendant was a registered co-owner of the Doll House, he knew that
Doll House escorts regularly engaged in sex acts for money, and the Doll House advertised
that its escorts engaged in sex acts for money, by providing a link to TER on its website.
Second, the probable cause statement put Defendant on notice that he was charged
with exploitation of prostitution because he "procured an inmate for a house of prostitution,"
or "encouraged, induced or otherwise purposely caused another to remain a prostitute," by
personally encouraging at least two escorts—N.F. and D.T.—to engage in sex acts for
money. R l l (Defendant told N.F. "B*tch, you're gonna have to make work") and R12
(Defendant told D.T. "to drive down the hill and get condoms and go back and 'work
something out5"). See also Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(l)(a), (b).
Third, the probable cause statement put Defendant on notice that he was charged with
exploitation of prostitution because he "encouraged, induced or otherwise purposely caused
another to remain a prostitute," by threatening two escorts if they quit working for the Doll
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House. R l l (Defendant threatened N.F. when she tried to leave the Doll House); R12
(Defendant threatened A.F. if she did not continue working for the Doll House).
Fourth, the probable cause statement put Defendant on notice that he was charged
with exploitation of prostitution because he "shared the proceeds of prostitution with a
prostitute pursuant to an understanding that she was to share therein." Supporting facts
included that for the first four appointments, H.T. paid the entire $145.00 agency fee to the
Doll House, which Defendant co-owned, R12, and other escorts stated that they were
required to tip Defendant's business owner 20% of their tips. R12-13.
The foregoing allegations put Defendant on specific notice of facts supporting at least
six counts of exploitation of prostitution, even though he was charged with only four counts.
And the probable cause statement explained that these allegations were a "non-exhaustive"
description of Defendant's on-going acts as reported to police. Rl 1-12.
The probable cause statement also fully apprised Defendant of the State's information
"regarding the time, place, and date of the crimes." Wilcox, 808 P.2d at 1033. Six of the
escorts reported Defendant's acts within a two to five month window, based on when they
worked for the Doll House. Rl 1 -12. The seventh escort placed the reported conduct during
the course of the year she worked for the Doll House. R13.
Defendant asserts that other than two factual episodes, the probable cause statement
did not put him on notice that he had committed any crime. Br. Aplt. 21-23. Defendant
acknowledges that one of those factual episodes could "reasonably be read" as alleging that
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he had "encouraged a non-prostitute to change her status to prostitute/5 but asserts that the
other alleges only the lesser offense of aiding prostitution, rather than exploiting prostitution.
Br. Aplt. 21-22. But, as shown above, the probable cause statement did articulate facts
alleging that Defendant engaged in more than four counts of exploiting prostitution by coowning a prostitution business and by engaging in an on-going pattern of conduct in which
he not only encouraged prostitution, but also shared in its proceeds.
Defendant also argues that the information and probable cause statement did not give
adequate notice, because they did not "provide a nexus . . . between the counts in the
information and the paragraphs in the probable cause statement." Br. Aplt. 24. Defendant,
however, cites no authority that the prosecution is required to tie every factual allegation in
its probable cause statement to a specific count in the information. Id. Here, the State
provided detailed factual allegations supporting six or more counts of exploiting prosecution;
yet it charged only four counts. This is not unlike child sex abuse prosecutions in which a
child alleges numerous incidences of abuse, but the State chooses to charge a much smaller
number of counts. See, e.g., State v. Reed, 2000 UT 68,ffi[1,6, 8 P.3d 1025 (Reed convicted
of three counts of sexual abuse, but evidence showed "some twenty to thirty incidents"). In
such cases, nothing prevents the State from adducing evidence proving more counts than
those charged. Notice requires only that the Defendant be sufficiently apprised of the factual
allegations to be able to prepare a defense. See Wilcox, 808 P.2d at 1032.
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As explained, the information and the probable cause statement put Defendant on
notice that he was charged with exploiting prostitution by virtue of his co-ownership of the
Doll House and his continuing pattern of on-going conduct in that capacity of encouraging
prostitution and sharing in its proceeds. That was the tenor of all the evidence presented at
trial. And while it is true that the probable cause statement said that its description of
Defendant's conduct was "non-exhaustive," Defendant received notice of all the evidence in
the prosecution's possession from the preliminary hearing, as well as from the recorded
statements of all the interviewed escorts and his partner Tiffany Curtis. R724-25. See State
v. Bernards, 2007 UT App 238, % 17 (adequate notice given in child sex abuse case where
probable cause statement gave detailed facts on each charged offense and where defendant
provided with recordings of interviews with victim).
In sum, Defendant was sufficiently apprised of the nature and cause of the charged
offenses to adequately prepare for trial.

Defendant also asserts that he did not receive sufficient notice of the charges, because the
exploiting prostitution statute "defines five separate crimes, not merely one crime which may
be committed in several different ways." Br. Aplt. 19-20. He contends that he was entitled
"to be charged with a specific crime," and that because the information cited only generally
to the statute, he did not receive adequate notice of the charges against him. Br. Aplt. 20-21.
This claim is both unpreserved and inadequately briefed. Defendant never argued below,
either in his request for a bill of particulars, or in his motion for an arrest ofjudgment that the
information provided insufficient notice merely because it cited generally to the statute and
did not elect between the various ways of coming exploiting prostitution. See R167,186-87,
323-345. That is reason alone to decline to consider this claim. See Winfield, 2006 UT 4, f
14 (appellate review unavailable for unpreserved claims where appellant does not argue any
exceptions to preservation rule). Defendant also has not given this Court any authority or
reasoned analysis to support this argument. That, too, is reason alone to decline to reach it.
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C. Defendant has not shown the lack of a bill of particulars prejudiced him.
Even if Defendant was entitled to a bill of particulars, he is not entitled to a new trial
unless he suffered prejudice. State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 105-06 (Utah 1988). He did not.
A defendant suffers prejudice for the lack of a bill of particulars when, "absent the
error, there was a reasonable likelihood of a result more favorable to the accused." Id. at
106. The first question in determining whether an alleged notice error harmed the defense is
"how the error impeded the accused's ability to prepare for trial and to meet the State's
case." Id.
Ordinarily, a defendant is assigned the burden of persuading the Court that "in light of
all the circumstances revealed through the record as a whole, there is a reasonable likelihood
that the trial result would have been more favorable absent the error." Id. However, when
the alleged error is the lack of adequate notice because of a wrongly denied bill of
particulars, "if the accused could make a credible argument that the [alleged] errors impaired
the defense," the burden of persuasion shifts to the State. Id. (citing State v. Knight, 734
P.2d 913, 920-21 (Utah 1987)).
Here, the burden of persuasion remains with Defendant because he has made no
"credible argument" that the lack of a bill of particulars "impaired his defense." Id. "In
assessing whether the defendant's argument of prejudicial impairment [rings] sufficiently

See State v. Thomas, 1999 UT 2,ffif11-13, 974 P.2d 269 (declining to reach inadequately
briefed claim).
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true to warrant shifting the burden of persuasion to the State," the Court must "take into
account the centrality of the matter affected by the prosecutor's errors." Id. at 106. The
reason Defendant gave below for asking for a bill of particulars was because it was
"impossible to reconcile the evidence provided with individual charges." Rl 86-87. This is
consistent with his argument on appeal that he was entitled to have the prosecution "provide
a nexus . . . between the counts in the information and the paragraphs in the probable cause
statement." Br. Aplt. 24.
Such a nexus, however, was not central to the defense at trial. The defense at trial
was that, although Doll House escorts might have committed sex acts for money, neither
Defendant nor the Doll House ever required them to do so, and neither shared in the
proceeds from acts of prostitution.

R838:16-21; R320:355-70.

Indeed, the defense

contended that Defendant took great pains to inform escorts about what they could and could
not legally do. R320:366. The defense stressed in opening that the way the agency fee was
split between the Doll House and the escort was "an important part of this case." R838:1920. The defense emphasized that the agency fee that went to Defendant as a co-owner of the
Doll House was strictly for legal conduct—going on a date and getting naked—and that any
money paid to an escort for illegal sexual activity went solely to the escort and personal tips
to Curtis. R838:19-20; see also R320:362-63, 367-68. Defendant also testified that he had
no knowledge that the escorts were engaging in illegal sexual activity, that he never
encouraged them to do so, and that he never knowingly transported them to an appointment
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where illegal sexual activity occurred. R320:271-73, 281-82, 293-94. To the extent that
Curtis's and the escorts' testimony contradicted the latter's, the defense challenged their
credibility through cross-examination and informing the jury of any motive to lie, including
their immunity agreements with the State, and any other benefits they may have gained from
their testimony. R319:112-13;R320:154-55, 161, 195-96,203,215-18,242,248,363-66.
On appeal, Defendant does not even allege how his defense would have changed if a
bill of particulars had created "a nexus" between individual counts and specific evidence. He
merely vaguely asserts that the information and probable cause statement did not give him
adequate notice to prepare a defense.
In fact, the defense presented at trial was crafted to meet every conceivable legal and
factual theory the State presented. And it is clear from the trial court record that defense
counsel was fully apprised before trial of every piece of evidence presented by the State.
Defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined each of the State's witnesses to advance his
theories. See, e.g.,R319:104-113,117-18,134-36,138; R320:158-61,172-75,195-203,214-23,
227,240-49. In addition to having Defendant testify, counsel also called a lawyer to testify
that, at Defendant's request, he had given training to Defendant's escorts on what was and
was not legal. R320:319-27.
In short, Defendant has not made a credible argument that the lack of a bill of
particulars "impeded [his] ability to prepare for trial and to meet the State's case." Bell, 770
P.2d at 106. Accordingly, he has not shown prejudice.
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II.
DEFENDANT MAY NOT OBTAIN APPELLATE REVIEW OF THE
JURY UNANIMITY INSTRUCTIONS, BECAUSE HE INVITED ANY
ERROR BY AFFIRMATIVELY REPRESENTING THAT HIS ONLY
OBJECTION TO THE INSTRUCTIONS WAS TO ANOTHER ISSUE
Background
Defendant next challenges the jury unanimity instructions. Br.Aplt 31-44. The jury
was instructed generally that its "verdict must be unanimous; all jurors must agree. When
you are all in agreement, then you have reached a verdict and your work is finished." R284.
Instruction 40, the exploiting-prostitution elements instruction, told that jury that
before it could convict Defendant of any of the four counts, it must find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Defendant, during the alleged time frame, "did commit an act or acts, which
standing alone for any such count, constitute the elements of the offense of Exploiting
Prostitution." R297. The instruction then set forth the five alternative statutory theories
alleged in the information. Id. At Defendant's request, the elements instruction added that it
could find Defendant guilty of only one count of exploiting prostitution under the theory that
he owned, controlled, managed, supervised, or otherwise kept a prostitution business. R298.
The instruction then added that if, "after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this
case," the jury was "convinced of the truth of each and every one of the elements of
Exploiting Prostitution, beyond a reasonable doubt," it must find the Defendant "guilty of
Exploiting prostitution for any such count." Id. (emphasis added). But if the jury was not
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"convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of Exploiting Prostitution for any
count," it must find the Defendant "not guilty of any such count." Id. (emphasis added).
Instruction 37, the pattern-of-unlawfiil-activity elements instruction, similarly
informed the jury that it could convict of that count only if it found beyond a reasonable
doubt that, during the alleged timeframe, Defendant "did commit an unlawful act or acts as
defined." R294. The instruction then set forth four alternative means of committing an
unlawful act under the pattern of unlawful activity statute. Id. Like the exploitingprostitution instruction, this instruction also told the jury that it could convict only if it was
first "convinced of the truth of each and every one of the elements of Engaging in a Pattern
of Unlawful Activity, beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. (emphasis added). But if the jury was
"not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of Engaging in a Pattern of
Unlawful Activity," then it must acquit Defendant. Id. (emphasis added).
During deliberations, the jury sent the following question to the court regarding the
two elements instructions:
In instruction #37, a, b, c, d, do all of them have to be fulfilled in order
to find the defendant guilty or just one of the conditions met? Also the same
question for instruction #40.
R312. The prosecution proposed telling the jury that any one condition could be met. R864.
But defense counsel argued that the jury should simply be told that they had "adequate
instructions and they should reread the jury instructions to find an answer." R864. The trial
court sent the following response:
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Both instructions 37 and 40's subparagraphs (the a, b, c's) you refer to
end with the word "or" and therefore should be read accordingly.
R312.

Defendant argues that the general jury unanimity instruction was insufficient to insure
a unanimous verdict, where the pattem-of-unlawful-activity and exploitation-of-prostitution
elements instructions permitted the jury to convict him under any one of several statutory
elements. R294, 297. Defendant contends that the trial court should have sua sponte
remedied this problem either by compelling the State to elect under which alternative
theories it wanted to proceed, or by specifically instructing the jury that it had to be
unanimous as to which alternative legal theory it was basing its verdict. Br. Aplt. 34-38.
Defendant also challenges the trial court's refusal under rule 606(b), Utah Rules of Evidence,
to consider statements from three jurors to defense investigators implying that the jury may
not have been unanimous as to the underlying alternative theories of the exploiting
prostitution counts. Br. Aplt. 38-43.
Defendant acknowledges that he "failed to request a specific jury unanimity
instruction." Br. Aplt. 36. He therefore asks this Court to review the jury unanimity
instructions for plain error. Id. at 36-37.
Defendant, however, is not entitled to even plain error review of this claim, because
he invited any error by affirmatively representing to the court that the only objection he had
to the jury instructions related to another issue. But even if plain error review were

39

available, Defendant has not shown obvious prejudicial error. And, because Defendant is not
entitled to appellate review of this issue in the first instance, this Court need not decide
whether the juror statements or testimony were admissible under rule 606(b). But if this
Court does reach the issue, the trial court correctly refused to consider the statements.
A. Defendant invited any error, thereby foreclosing appellate review of his
jury unanimity claim.
As explained in Point LA, invited error precludes even plain error review. See Pratt,
2007UT41,^j 15. This rule has been vigorously applied to the jury instruction context. See
Hamilton, 2003 UT 22,fflf54-55; Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16,ffif9-13; State v. Anderson, 929
P.2d 1107, 1109 (Utah 1996); State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1023 (Utah 1987).
Rule 19(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires that objections to written
instructions "be made before the instructions are given to the jury." And "[u]nless a party
objects to an instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction may not be
assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice." Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e). The term
"manifest injustice," in this context, is "synonymous with the 'plain error' standard." State
v. Alinas, 2007 UT 83, % 10, 171 P.3d 1046.
The Utah Supreme Court has explained, however, that to obtain appellate review
under the manifest injustice or plain error exception, "counsel must have failed \o object to
the instruction"—that is "'merely remained silent at trial.'" Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^f 54
(quoting Medina, 738 P.2d at 1023).

But if counsel, "either by statement or act,

affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection to the jury instruction,
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[the appellate court] will not review the instruction under the manifest injustice exception."
Id. Utah appellate courts "adhere to this rule for two important reasons." Id. First, it
promotes the "long-established policy that the trial court should have the first opportunity to
address the claim of error." Id.

Second, "'it discourages parties from intentionally

misleading the trial court so as to preserve a hidden ground for reversal on appeal.'" Id
(quoting State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993)).
Utah appellate courts have found invited instructional error (1) when counsel
proffered an erroneous instruction, see Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16,ffl[8,12; (2) when counsel
objected to the use of a correct jury instruction and later challenged a substituted erroneous
jury instruction on appeal, see State v. Chaney, 1999 UT App 309, If 55, 989 P.2d 1091; (3)
when counsel actively represented that she had read the instruction and had no objection to
it, see Medina, 738 P.2d at 1023; (4) when counsel failed to object to an instruction when
specifically queried by the trial court, see State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107,1108-09; and (5)
when counsel affirmatively represented to the trial court that he had no objections to the jury
instructions, see Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^f 54.
Here, defendant invited any error by affirmatively representing to the trial court that,
other than an unrelated issue, he had no objections to the jury instructions as given. After the
defense rested, the trial court gave both sides a proposed set of written jury instructions,
which the court had prepared after reviewing the instructions proposed by both the State and
the defense. R320:33-34. After giving the parties time to review the instructions, the trial
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court asked the State if it had "[a]ny objections to the instructions as provided." R320:334.
After hearing the State's concerns, the trial court turned to defense counsel. R320:336.
Defense counsel asked the court to delete some of the alternatives in the exploitation-ofprostitution elements instructions for lack of evidence, and to expressly limit conviction of
one of the alternatives to only one count. R320:337-41. Defendant never asked the trial
court to give the specific unanimity instruction that he now claims was required. Id.
After granting part of defense counsel's request, the trial court asked, "Anything
else?" Defense counsel replied, "That's all I have, Judge." R320:341.
Defendant subsequently re-affirmed that he had no objections to the adequacy of the
instructions when, after the jury sent its question on the elements instructions, he told the
trial court that he believed "no additional instruction was necessary," and that the jury should
be told that they had "adequate instructions," and that they "should reread the jury
instructions to find an answer." R863-64.
By affirmatively representing that he had no other objections to the jury instructions,
defense counsel led the trial court into believing that its proposed unanimity instruction was
both correct and sufficient. See Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, ^ 54; Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109;
Medina, 738 P.2d at 1023. The invited error doctrine, therefore, precludes appellate review.
B. Even if plain error review were appropriate, Defendant has not shown
obvious, prejudicial error in the unanimity instructions.
Even if Defendant were entitled to manifest injustice or plain error review, he cannot
prevail. To establish "manifest injustice" or "plain error" in the unanimity jury instructions,
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Defendant must show that (1) an error exists; (2) the error should have been manifest or
obvious to the trial court; and (3) the error is harmful. State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, ^f 16, 20
P.3d 888. Defendant has not shown obvious, prejudicial error.
"To establish that the error should have been obvious to the trial court, [Defendant]
must show that the law governing the error was clear at the time the alleged error was made."
State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, ^j 16, 95 P.3d 276. Defendant has not made, and cannot make,
this showing.
It is true that, with the exception of the alternative mental states for murder, "jury
unanimity is necessary as to all other elements in criminal cases." State v. Standiford, 769
P.2d 254, 258 (Utah 1988) (citing State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 577-80, 585-88 (Utah
1988) (Stewart, J., concurring and concurring in the result and Durham, J., concurring and
dissenting)). See also State v. Evans, 2001 UT 22, f 17,20 P.3d 888 (unanimity necessary as
to all elements of an offense); State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, \ 60, 992 P.3d 951 (Utah
1999) (plurality) ("Jury unanimity means unanimity as to a specific crime and as to each
element of the crime"). Thus, in Saunders, the Utah Supreme Court expressly disapproved
of the following "non-unanimity" instruction: "[T]here is no requirement that the jurors be
unanimous about precisely which act occurred or when or where the act or acts occurred.
The only requirement is that each juror believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, that at least one
prohibited act occurred [during the period set forth in the information]." Id. at ^f 65.
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But no settled governing law has held that the unanimity instructions given in this
case were deficient. To the contrary, one Utah Supreme Court decision questioned whether
there was any error, obvious or otherwise, in similar unanimity instructions. See Evans,
2001 UT 22, ^j 15-17. Evans was charged with attempted aggravated murder. Id. at % 15
n. 1. The charges alleged two alternative statutory aggravating circumstances, which elevated
the crime from simple attempted murder to attempted aggravated murder. Id. The Evans
jury instructions "set forth alternative theories [of the aggravating circumstances] on which
the jury could convict defendant, but the instructions did not explain that the jury must be
unanimous as to the theory relied upon for the conviction." Id. at \ 15. But the instructions
did inform the jury that before it could convict Evans, it must find "beyond a reasonable
doubt, all of the following elements of that crime." Id. at%\5n.\

(emphasis added).

Like Defendant here, Evans neither objected to the absence of a specific instruction
on jury unanimity, nor did he propose such an instruction. Id. at \ 16. The Utah Supreme
Court noted that the unanimity issue was "arguably unclear," and therefore not obvious, at
the time of Evans's trial. Id. at \ 17. But "[e]ven accepting the notion that failure to instruct
the jury as to unanimity was an obvious error at the time of [Evans's] trial," the Court was
"not convinced that the instructions requested by defendant and given by the trial court...
[rose] to the level of the [erroneous] 'non-unanimity' instruction at issue in Saunders" Id. at
T| 17. The Evans court was also "unconvinced" that any "slight confusion that may have
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arisen from the wording of the instructions" presented "a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result for defendant." Id. at % 17.
The instructions here were even less "confusing" than those in Evans. The jury here,
like the jury in Evans, was told that it could find Defendant guilty only if it was "convinced
of the truth of each and every one of the elements," beyond a reasonable doubt," of pattern of
unlawful activity and exploiting prostitution. R294; R298 (emphasis added). The jury here
was also told that its verdict had to be unanimous. R284. That instruction, when read with
the general unanimity instruction, sufficiently advised the jury that it must be unanimous as
to each element of the crimes. Certainly, if the Evans's unanimity instructions were not
obviously erroneous or prejudicial, the instructions here were not.
C. This Court need not determine whether the juror statements were
admissible under rule 606(b).
In support of his motion to arrest judgment, Defendant sought to introduce statements
by jurors, which he alleges prove that the jury was not unanimous as to which of the
alternative theories they based their conviction. R351-55; Br. Aplt. 38-43. The trial court
ruled that rule 606(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, precluded consideration of those statements.
R711-14. Defendant challenges that ruling on appeal. Br. Aplt. 38-43.
This Court need not reach this issue, because under either the invited or plain error
doctrines, Defendant is not entitled to appellate review of the correctness of the unanimity
instructions. The juror statements would be relevant only to whether any error in the
instructions in fact prejudiced Defendant by causing the verdict to be non-unanimous. But if
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this Court nevertheless addresses the issue, the trial court correctly ruled that rule 606(b),
Utah Rules of Evidence, precluded consideration of the statements.
"Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment," rule 606(b) allows juror
testimony on the question of "whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear
upon any juror." Utah R. Evid. 606(b). But the rule strictly prohibits juror testimony "as to
any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the effect
of anything upon that or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent
to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental processes in
connection therewith."
Juror statements suggesting that some of the jurors were possibly confused about the
unanimity requirement do not relate to "whether any outside influence was improperly
brought to bear upon any juror." Utah R. Evid. 606(b). Rather, they relate to a "matter or
statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations," precisely the kind of
information prohibited by rule 606(b) and precedent. See, e.g., Groen v. Tri-O-Inc, 667
P.2d 598, 603 (Utah 1983) (evidence jury was confused or misunderstood or disregarded
facts or applicable law inadmissible as violative of long-standing policy against attempts to
undermine integrity of verdict); State v. Thomas, 830 P.2d 243, 248 n.4 (Utah 1992)
(evidence to show jurors' opinions, surmises or processes of reasoning inadmissible by
affidavit or testimony); State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89, 95 (Utah 1981) (trial court properly
refused to receive juror affidavit because it did not allege verdict was determined "by chance
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or as a result of bribery"); State v. Gee, 498 P.2d 662, 665 (Utah 1972) (juror testimony that
jurors discussed defendant's failure to take stand inadmissible); Johnson v. Simons, 551 P.2d
515,516 (Utah 1976) (juror affidavits that jury was confused on law as stated in instructions
were inadmissible). The trial court, therefore, properly declined to consider the proffered
juror statements.
III.
THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S
SUFFICIENCY CLAIM, WHERE HE FAILS TO MARSHAL THE
EVIDENCE; IN ANY EVENT, THE EVIDENCE MORE THAN
SUFFICED TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions for
exploiting prostitution and pattern of unlawful activity. Br. Aplt. 44-62. This Court should
decline to review this claim because Defendant has not marshaled the evidence. Should this
Court excuse Defendant's that failure, the evidence more than sufficed to support the jury's
verdict on all counts.
A.

Defendant has failed to marshal the evidence.
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a jury verdict, an appellate

court views "the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it in the
light most favorable to the verdict of the jury." State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 343 (Utah
1997). "Ordinarily, a reviewing court may not reassess credibility or reweigh the evidence,
but must resolve conflicts in the evidence in favor of the jury verdict." State v. Workman,
852 P.2d 981,984 (Utah 1993). An appellate court will reverse ajury conviction only when
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the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, "is sufficiently inconclusive
or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime of which he [or she] was convicted." Brown, 948
P.2d at 343 (citation omitted). Cf. State v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, % 14, 210 P.3d 288.
To prevail on a sufficiency challenge, the appellant must marshal all the evidence in
support of the verdict and then demonstrate that, even viewed in the light most favorable to
the verdict, the evidence is insufficient. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, \ 76,100 P.3d 1177.
The marshaling burden is difficult. To properly discharge it, the appellant must present, "in
comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial
which supports the very findings the appellant resists." Chen, 2004 UT 82, \ 77 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The appellant must then "ferret out a fatal flaw in the
evidence." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App. 1991).
It is not enough to "simply provide an exhaustive review of all evidence presented at trial."
Chen, 2004 UT 82, ^J 77 (citation omitted). "Rather, appellants must provide a precisely
focused summary of all the evidence supporting the [challenged verdict]." Chen, 2004 UT
82, Tf 77. Failure to meet the marshaling burden is grounds alone for rejecting an attack on
the sufficiency of the evidence. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 800 (Utah
1991).
Defendant has not met his marshaling burden. Although he recites some of the
evidence against him, he does not present, "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every
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scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings the
appellant resists." Chen, 2004 UT 82, f 77 (citation omitted). Nor does he "ferret out a fatal
flaw in the evidence." Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d at 1315. Instead, he reargues the
credibility of the witnesses against him, see Br. Aplt. 12-13, 55-58, and draws all inferences
from the evidence in his favor and against the jury's verdict, see Br. Aplt. 46-62.
Defendant's failure to marshal is highlighted by his failure to acknowledge the trial
court's denial of his arrest ofjudgment based on the "mountain of evidence" supporting the
jury's verdict. R699; Add. B. Indeed, "[w]ithout attempting to create an exliaustive list" of
the evidence supporting the verdict, the trial court set forth five pages of "marshaled"
evidence. R700-05. The trial court then spent two more pages explaining how Defendant's
"own marshaling of the evidence" supported the jury's verdict. R707-10. Defendant ignores
the trial court's marshaling efforts and instead reargues the sufficiency of the evidence, cast
in the light most favorable to his position.
This Court should therefore reject Defendant's sufficiency challenges.
B.

The marshaled evidence supports four exploiting prostitution convictions.
Should this Court excuse Defendant's failure to marshal, the evidence is more than

sufficient to support Defendant's four exploiting prostitution convictions.
1. The elements of exploiting prostitution.
A person exploits prostitution if he:
(a)

procures an inmate for a house of prostitution or place in a house of
prostitution for one who would be an inmate;
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(b)

encourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes another to become
or remain a prostitute;

(c)

transports a person into or within this state with a purpose to promote
that person's engaging in prostitution or procuring or paying for
transportation with that purpose;

(d)

not being a child or legal dependent of a prostitute, shares the proceeds
of prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to their understanding that he is to
share therein; or

(e)

owns, controls, manages, supervises, or otherwise keeps, alone or in
association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(1). Prostitution includes engaging "in any sexual activity
with another person for a fee." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1302(l)(a). "Sexual activity"
means "acts of masturbation, sexual intercourse, or any sexual act involving the genitals of
one person and the mouth or anus of another person." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1301(4).
At the outset, Defendant argues that the trial court did not instruct the jury regarding
the mental state for exploiting prostitution, which he argues is "purposeful." Br. Aplt. 60.
Defendant, however, does not argue that he is entitled to a reversal based on the trial court's
alleged failure to instruct the jury on the appropriate mental state. Id. Nor could he because,
as explained in Point II.A above, he invited any error by affirmatively telling the trial court
that other than an unrelated matter, he had no objections to the jury instructions.
In any event, the jury was instructed on the mental state for exploiting prostitution.
Instruction No. 36, which preceded the elements instructions for all of the charges, required
that the jury find that Defendant acted at least knowingly:
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The crime with which defendant is charged here involves the conduct
of another person, in addition to himself. In order to find Defendant guilty,
you must find that Defendant had knowledge of the wrongful or illegal
conduct of the other person. If for instance, you find that a person committed
prostitution while working in connection with Defendant']s escort agency, it
is necessary for you to find that Defendant knew of that conduct in advance, or
on an ongoing basis and that he encouraged it, in order to convict him of the
crime charged.
R293. By requiring the jury to find not only that Defendant knew of his escorts' illegal
conduct, but also that he encouraged it, Instruction No. 36, in effect, required that the jury
find that Defendant acted at least purposefully.
2. The evidence supporting the elements of exploiting prostitution.
The following evidence supports the jury verdict that Defendant knowingly or
purposefully committed at least four counts of exploiting prostitution.
Subsection (e). First, the evidence overwhelming proved that, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(l)(e), Defendant "own[ed], controlled], manage[d], supervise[d],
or otherwise ke[pt], alone or in association with another, a house of prostitution or a
prostitution business." The evidence established that Defendant and Ms. Curtis co-owned
and operated the Doll House. R319:4,197. Defendant was the managing partner. R319:23;
R320:257,262-63. Defendant set up a website to advertise their escort agency. R319:122.
The website provided a link to "The Erotic Review" ("TER"), a national website where
patrons posted reviews of escort agencies, including the Doll House. R319:16, 83; R320:
308-10. Defendant regularly read reviews on TER which specified sex acts that Doll House
escorts had performed. R319:83-85; R320:125-27, 308-11, 310-12. Defendant wrote his

51

own fictitious reviews of his escorts detailing sex acts that his escorts would be willing to
perform. R319:l 16-17. Defendant and Ms. Curtis discussed bad reviews with the escorts in
a company meeting and encouraged them to generate positive reviews. R319:114, 125-26.
Poor reviews, which included "refusing to get naked" and "refusing to have sex," were "bad"
for business. R319:85,114-15. Defendant and Ms. Curtis referred to escorts willing to have
sex with a client as "bailers," because they were willing to "play ball." R319:87.
Defendant knew that his escorts regularly engaged in sex acts for money, not only
from the TER reviews, but because they regularly discussed their sexual services with him.
See R319:87-88, 103; R320:187. Defendant was also present at a bachelor party where he
took photos of two of his escorts performing oral sex on each other. R319:97-98.
In addition to encouraging good TER reviews—which entailed a willingness to
perform sex acts for money—Defendant also personally encouraged his escorts to prostitute
themselves for less money than they wanted. For example, when Defendant learned that an
escort had given a client only "a blow job" for a $400 tip, he told her that she needed to be
"more liberal than that." R230:235-36. When another escort balked at having unprotected
sex with a regular client for too little money, Defendant told her to go to a gas station, buy
condoms, go back, and "make the guy happy." R320:186.
In short, Defendant actively advertised and promoted his escorts as being willing to
engage in sex acts for money. The jury could have reasonably inferred from the evidence
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that he did so to increase the number of appointments and, therefore, the volume of agency
fees, that the Doll House received.
Defendant nevertheless contends that the State never proved that he kept "a house of
prostitution" or "prostitution business," within the meaning of the statute Br. Aplt. 47-49,
53-55. "House of prostitution" is "a place where prostitution or promotion of prostitution is
regularly carried on by one or more persons under the control, management, or supervision
of another." Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1301(1). Defendant asserts that this definition means
only a physical place at which acts of prostitution are committed. Br. Aplt. 47-48. In
contrast, Defendant contends, the Doll House merely "sent escorts to multiple locations
throughout Utah." Br. Aplt. 48. Defendant relies on the "common usage" of "house of
prostitution" as used in the dictionary and on early to mid-twentieth century case law to
support his argument. Id.
But the plain language of the statute does not base its definition on whether the
prostitute makes house calls or confines her work to one physical location. While the statute
plainly covers a place where prostitution "is regularly carried on," it also covers a place
where "promotion o/prostitution is carried on by one or more persons under the control,
management, or supervision of another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1301(1) (emphasis
added). That definition clearly contemplates that the acts promoted could be committed
elsewhere.
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The evidence here showed that the "promotion of prostitution" was carried on from
Ms. Curtis's Cottonwood home under the "control, management, or supervision" of
Defendant and Ms. Curtis. Defendant took photos of all the escorts at the Cottonwood
location to post on the Doll House webpage, which in turn provided a link to TER,
describing the sex acts escorts were willing to engage in. In a search of the Cottonwood
location, police found copies of TER reviews detailing the sex acts Doll House escorts would
perform for money. R319:24. Appointments were made over the phone or through the
Internet at the Cottonwood location. R319:19. Fees and tips from those appointments,
which included sex acts for money, were paid out after each appointment at the Cottonwood
address. State's Ex. 29; R319:95, 111-12,124,136;R320:212, 222. Defendant was nearly
always there, often counting money, when the escorts returned from appointments. R319:95,
124. Defendant also paid for the Doll House's business expenses from the Cottonwood
address. R319:19-36. And, as noted, Defendant encouraged his escorts to perform sex acts
for money.
But even if Defendant's definition of "house of prostitution" were correct, subsection
(e) also prohibits running a "prostitution business." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(l)(e).
Although that term is not defined in the statute, its plain meaning surely encompasses a
business that hires "escorts" and then promotes them as "prostitutes" on the Internet.
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In short, the evidence was more than sufficient to prove that Defendant
knowingly—or purposefully—owned, controlled, managed, supervised, or otherwise kept a
house of prostitution or a prostitution business.
Subsection (a). The evidence was also sufficient to support a finding under
subsection (a) that Defendant "procure[d] an inmate for a house of prostitution or place in a
house of prostitution for one who would be an inmate." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(l)(a).
An "inmate" means "a person who engages in prostitution in or through the agency of a
house of prostitution." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1301(2).
As stated, the Doll House fits within the statutory plain meaning of "house of
prostitution." Likewise, the Doll House escorts fit within the statutory definition of
"inmates," where they all testified that they engaged in prostitution through the agency of the
Doll House. All the appointments in which the illegal sex acts testified to were made
through the Doll House. Defendant tries to avoid the consequence of this fact by claiming
that the Doll House contracted only for an escort "to show up and fully disrobe," and that
any sex acts that occurred were from a second and separate contract solely between the
escort and the client. Br. Aplt. 53. That argument ignores the fact that the escorts were
required, in exchange for the agency fee of $ 145, to stay a full 50 minutes and that any "tips"
for sex acts negotiated by the escort would be earned during that "agency" time. See State's
Ex. 29 at 4, 6 (escort required to remain full 50 minutes and client could pay to extend the
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time). It also ignores the fact that Defendant advertised his escorts' prostitution to increase
the number of appointments that the Doll House could book.
Here, the evidence established that Defendant procured inmates for his house of
prostitution. He interviewed, photographed, hired, trained, and advertised the sexual
repertoire of Doll House escorts. SeeR3l9:12, 80, 121;R320:164, 177, 181-82,209, 23132,269-70. He both knew that his escorts were prostituting themselves on appointments and
encouraged them to do so. R319:125; R320:167, 183, 210, 234; see e.g., R319:125-28;
R320:183-88, 233-36, 239.

Five of the escorts testified that Defendant personally

interviewed them before hiring. The evidence, therefore, supported at least four convictions
under subsection (a).
Subsection (b).

The evidence was also sufficient to prove that Defendant

"encourage[d], induce[d], or otherwise purposely cause[d] another to become or remain a
prostitute." Defendant coached the escorts on how to avoid being arrested for prostitution
R320:154. He offered to pay for their lawyer if they were arrested. R319:98; R320:155-56.
As shown, he discussed their TER reviews with them and encouraged more services for less
money. He told escorts when he thought they were charging too much for sexual activity
and when they did not provide enough for the money received. He also operated a business
that gave the escorts referrals based on how much of a tip his partner received from the
sexual activity of the escorts. State's Ex. 29 at 5. Taken together, the above evidence
amounted to encouraging and/or inducing another to become or remain a prostitute.

56

Defendant also encouraged one of his "top earners" to remain a prostitute by
threatening her when she quit. R319:128-34. That escort testified that after receiving a
threatening text from an ex-boyfriend, she sent Curtis a text message that she did not want to
work for the Doll House any more. R319:129. When the escort did not respond to Curtis's
text asking if they could do anything to work things out, Defendant began sending texts and
leaving voice mail messages that if the escort "did not call him back... he was going to be
forced to take some measures against [her]," for which "he could not be held responsible."
R319:130-31. The escort did not call him back and, six months later, he carried through on
this threat by sending a letter to her parents disclosing that she was a prostitute and attaching
copies of her TER reviews, her MySpace page, and her photos on the Doll House website.
R319:100,131-34; State' s Ex. 30. Defendant's threats amounted to encouraging or inducing
someone to remain a prostitute.8
The evidence was therefore sufficient to support at least one count of exploiting
prostitution under subsection (b).

Defendant argues that "encouraging someone to become or remain[] a prostitute
refers to a change of status; not encouraging individual prostitution acts." Br. Aplt. 51-52.
He asserts that no testimony shows that Defendant "encouraged anyone to change their status
from nonprostitute to prostitute"; that he was "confronted by an employee contemplating
reversion to nonprostitute from prostitute"; or that he "encouraged someone to continue in
their prostitute status." Br. Aplt. 51-52. The State disagrees that the statutory language is so
narrow. But, in any event, the acts detailed above—hiring, training, advertising, encouraging
sex acts for less, giving more appointments to bigger tippers, and threatening an escort who
wanted to quit—all amount to encouragement and inducements to continue prostituting
themselves for his benefit. Such conduct falls well within the statutory plain language.
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Subsection (c). The evidence more than sufficed to support at least one count that
Defendant transported] a person into or within this state with a purpose to promote that
person's engaging in prostitution... with that purpose." Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-1305(l)(c).
One escort, Nicole Fernandez, testified that Defendant drove her to an appointment with a
regular client. On the way Defendant told her that the client usually tipped $400 and that
sexual activity—beyond a lap dance—would be expected. R320:233-34. When Ms.
Fernandez later told Defendant that she had given the client a "blow job" for the $400 tip, he
told her she needed to be "more liberal than that." R320:235-26. That testimony, which the
jury presumably believed, was sufficient to prove one count that the Defendant transported a
person with the purpose to promote her engaging in prostitution.
Defendant seeks to undercut Ms. Fernandez's testimony by asking this Court to
reassess her credibility. Br. Aplt. 55-58. But, as explained, an appellate court ordinarily will
not reweigh or reassess a witness's credibility; rather it must resolve all conflicts in the
evidence in favor of the jury verdict. Workman, 852 P.2d at 984. Defendant relies on State
v. Robbins, 2009 UT 23, f 14, 210 P.3d 288, to urge this Court to disregard Ms. Fernandez's
testimony. Br. Aplt. 55-58. Defendant's reliance is misplaced.
Robbins reaffirmed that in a sufficiency challenge, an appellate court reviews "the
evidence and all reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the jury verdict." Robbins, 2009 UT 23, \ 14 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).

It also confirmed that a jury "can convict on the basis of the
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uncorroborated testimony of the victim." Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Robbins court stated, however, that a trial court may, when considering a motion to
arrest judgment, "reevaluate the jury's determination of testimony credibility in cases 'where
a sole witness presents inherently contradictory testimony that is equivocal or the result of
coercion, and there is a complete lack of circumstantial evidence.'" Id. at ^f 18 (quoting
Bowles v. Indiana, 111 N.E2d 1150, 1152 (Ind. 2000)).
Defendant argues that Ms. Fernandez's testimony falls within that category of
inherent improbability because she had a motive to lie, her trial testimony contradicted her
prior statements to police, and she testified at trial that she had sex with more Doll House
clients than she had admitted to at the preliminary hearing. Br. Aplt. 55-57.
Ms. Fernandez's testimony, however, falls well outside that contemplated as
inherently improbable by Robbins. First, she was not the "sole witness" against Defendant.
Rather, her testimony of Defendant's encouragement to engage in sex acts for money was
generally corroborated by many other witnesses. Indeed, Defendant himself testified that he
"occasionally" drove escorts to their appointments. R320:294. He just denied that he
knowingly drove them to a location where a sex act was committed. Id. Given the
overwhelming testimony that Defendant both knew about and encouraged acts of
prostitutions, Defendant's testimony was far more improbable than Ms. Fernandez's.
Second, Ms. Fernandez's testimony was not "inherently contradictory," "equivocal,"
or the "result of coercion." Robbins, 2009 UT 23, Tf 18. Ms. Fernandez's trial testimony was
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internally consistent and largely consistent with her preliminary hearing testimony.
Compare R320:230-51 with R81:66-90. Although she initially told police that she did not
have sex with any Doll House client, she explained that this was because she was afraid the
police would charge her if she admitted to doing so. R 320:245-47, 250-51.
Finally, a trial court's denial of a sufficiency claim in an arrest of judgment lends
support to the jury's verdict. Id. at ^f 15. The trial court, here, having had the opportunity to
see all the witnesses testify, did not find Ms. Fernandez's testimony inherently improbable.
R697-707.
In short, Ms. Fernandez's testimony was not "inherently improbable" such that the
trial court was required to disregard it. The evidence was therefore sufficient to support a
conviction for transporting a prostitute for the purpose of promoting her engaging in
prostitution.
Subsection (d). Finally, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that
Defendant "share[d] the proceeds of prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to their
understanding that he is to share therein." Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305(l)(d).
Defendant contends that no evidence supports a finding that he shared in any proceeds
of prostitution pursuant to any agreement because the $95 agency fee that went to company
was only for the escort to "show up and fully disrobe." Br. Aplt. 53. He contends that any
tips for sexual activity were strictly the result of private negotiations between the escort and
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the client. Br. Aplt. 53. He also insists that while Ms. Curtis received a percentage of those
tips, he never did. Br. Aplt. 52-53.
Defendant misstates the true nature of his business and how proceeds were shared.
First, as noted, the set agency fee of $145 guaranteed a client 50 minutes of a naked escort's
time. The Doll House received $95—over half—of the set agency fee, while the escort
received only $50. To earn more, the escort needed to ear "tips" for sex acts. She
performed those sex acts during the 50 minutes already purchased from the Doll House.
Indeed, according to the policy manual, a client could pay an additional agency fee if he
wished to extend the time with the escort. State's Ex. 29 at 6. Thus, Defendant shared in the
proceeds of prostitution pursuant to an understanding with the prostitute.
Second, the evidence showed that Defendant advertised the sex acts his escorts were
willing to perform to increase the number of appointments booked, thereby increasing the
volume of agency fees. Again, the agency fee included proceeds of prostitution and
Defendant shared in those proceeds pursuant to an understanding with the prostitute.
Finally, although not necessary to the analysis, one escort testified that she saw
Defendant commingling the agency fee with the tips paid to Ms. Curtis. R320:226-27. That
testimony supported a finding that Defendant shared in the proceeds of prostitution pursuant
to an understanding with the prostitute.
In sum, the testimony overwhelmingly established that Defendant was guilty of at
least four counts of exploiting prostitution.
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C.

The evidence was more than sufficient to support Defendant's conviction
of engaging in a pattern of unlawful activity.
Defendant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his pattern of

unlawful activity conviction. Br. Aplt. 59-62.
An "unlawful activity" means "to directly engage in conduct or to solicit, request,
command, encourage, or intentionally aid another person to engage in conduct which would
constitute any offense described by the following crimes or categories of crimes, or to
attempt or conspire to engage in an act which would constitute any of those offenses . . . . "
Utah Code Ann. 76-10-1602(4). Exploiting prostitution is one of the listed offenses. Utah
Code Ann. § 76-10-1602(4)(aaaa).
A "'[pjattern of unlawful activity' means engaging in conduct which constitutes the
commission of at least three episodes of unlawful activity, which episodes are not isolated,
but have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of
commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics." Utah Code
Ann. § 76-10-1602(2). Thus, the State had to prove that Defendant engaged in at least three
episodes of exploiting prostitution.
The State then had to prove one of the following:
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived
whether directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful activity in which the
person has participated as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly,
any part of that income, or the proceeds of the income, or the proceeds derived
from the investment or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition of any interest
in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise;
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(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of unlawful activity to
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any
enterprise.
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise to conduct or participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the
conduct of that enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful activity.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any provision of
Subsection (1), (2), or (3).
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603.
Defendant asserts, with no explanation or supporting citations to the record, that "the
State failed to prove the three predicate episodes—episodes limited to the charged conduct
contained with the Information—required by a Pattern of Unlawful Activity's definition."
Br. Aplt. 59. But, as shown above, the State did prove at least three episodes of exploiting
prostitution.
Defendant next contends that the State "failed to prove a nexus between a Pattern of
Unlawful Activity and an enterprise as required by law." Br. Aplt. 59. Specifically,
Defendant argues that the State did not introduce evidence that Defendant used profits from
exploiting prostitution "to acquire, establish or operate any enterprise"; or that he "acquired
or maintained, either directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise
through Exploiting Prostitution"; or that he "directly or indirectly conducted or participated
in any enterprise's affairs through Exploiting Prostitution." Br. Aplt. 59.
Contrary to Defendant's claims, ample evidence at trial proved that Defendant used
profits from exploiting prostitution to operate or maintain an enterprise, i.e., the Doll House.
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See Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602(1) (defining "enterprise" as including any "partnership,
corporation, business trust,... or other legal entity"). As explained above, the Doll House's
set agency fees constituted proceeds of exploiting prostitution.

The State produced

substantial evidence that Defendant used those proceeds to pay business expenses of the Doll
House, including advertising, phone bills, and purchasing cars. R319:7-36; R320:306-08.
The evidence was therefore sufficient to support Defendant's pattern of unlawful
activity conviction.
IV.
DEFENDANT INVITED ANY ERROR ON HIS CLAIM THAT AN
ERRONEOUS JURY INSTRUCTION CREATED A FATAL
VARIANCE FROM THE INFORMATION
Defendant finally claims that Jury Instruction No. 37, the elements instruction for
pattern of unlawful activity, created a fatal variance with the information. Br. Aplt. 62-64.
Defendant invited any error by affirmatively representing that other than an unrelated issue,
he had no objection to the jury instructions.
Count I of the information expressly charged Defendant with violating the first three
subsections of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602. R8-9. It did not cite to subsection (4) which
provides that it is unlawful "for any person to conspire to violate any provision of Subsection
(1), (2), or (3). Id. Count I, however, did state that Defendant "committed an act or acts in
the pursuance of such attempt or conspiracy" between July 1,2004 and April 30,2006. R9.
The pattern of unlawful activity elements instruction listed all four subsections of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-10-1602, as alternative bases for convicting Defendant of Count I. R. Defendant
64

contends that giving the jury an alternative basis not included in the inforaiation created a
fatal variance. Br. Aplt. 63-64.
Just as Defendant invited any error to the unanimity instructions, see Point II.A, he
invited any error on this instruction. As stated, defense counsel affirmatively represented to
the trial court that the only objection he had to the instructions was on an unrelated issue. R
320:33-41. Then later, when the jury sent out a question asking about the alternatives in this
very instruction, he told the trial court that the instructions were adequate and he urged the
court to simply respond that the jury should re-read the instructions. R863-64.
Defendant's invited error forecloses appellate review.9
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.

9

In any event, it is difficult to see how Defendant suffered any prejudice. A variance
in the information implicates notice. See State v. Kirgan, 712 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1985).
Here, the information put Defendant on notice that the State was also relying on a
"conspiracy55 theory. R8-9. More importantly, any defense to the fourth variation—which
prohibited a conspiracy to commit the other three variations—was necessarily subsumed in
the defense to the charged variations.
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ADDENDUM A
Constitutional Provisions, Statutes, and Rules

Utah Const. Art. I, § 10. Trial by Jury
In capital cases the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.
In capital cases the jury shall consist of twelve persons, and in all
other felony cases, the jury shall consist of no fewer than eight
persons. In other cases, the Legislature shall establish the number of
jurors by statute, but in no event shall a jury consist of fewer than
four persons. In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In
civil cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in
civil cases shall be waived unless demanded.

Utah Const. Art. I, § 12. Rights of Accused Persons
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to
testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against
him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an
impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is alleged
to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be
compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence
against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her
husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person be
twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary
examination, the function of that examination is limited to
determining whether probable cause exists unless otherwise provided
by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of
reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in
part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at
any pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if
appropriate discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule.

Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-1. Time and Place of Alleged
Offense—Specification
The prosecuting attorney, on timely written demand of the
defendant, shall within ten days, or such other time as the court may
allow, specify in writing as particularly as is known to him the place,
date and time of the commission of the offense charged.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1301. Definitions
For the purposes of this part:
(1) "House of prostitution" means a place where prostitution or
promotion of prostitution is regularly carried on by one or more
persons under the control, management, or supervision of another.
(2) "Inmate" means a person who engages in prostitution in or
through the agency of a house of prostitution.
(3) "Public place" means any place to which the public or any
substantial group of the public has access.
(4) "Sexual activity" means acts of masturbation, sexual intercourse,
or any sexual act involving the genitals of one person and the mouth
or anus of another person, regardless of the sex of either participant.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1302. Prostitution
(1) A person is guilty of prostitution when:
(a) he engages in any sexual activity with another person for a
fee;
(b) is an inmate of a house of prostitution; or
(c) loiters in or within view of any public place for the purpose
of being hired to engage in sexual activity.
(2) Prostitution is a class B misdemeanor. However, any person who
is convicted a second time, and on all subsequent convictions, under
this section or under a local ordinance adopted in compliance with
Section 76-10-1307 is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, except as
provided in Section 76-10-1309.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1304. Aiding Prostitution
(1) A person is guilty of aiding prostitution if he:
(a) solicits a person to patronize a prostitute;
(b) procures or attempts to procure a prostitute for a patron;
(c) leases or otherwise permits a place controlled by the actor,
alone or in association with another, to be used for prostitution
or the promotion of prostitution; or
(d) solicits, receives, or agrees to receive any benefit for doing
any of the acts prohibited by this subsection.
(2) Aiding prostitution is a class B misdemeanor. However, a person
who is convicted a second time, and on all subsequent convictions,
under this section or under a local ordinance adopted in compliance
with Section 76-10-1307 is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1305. Exploiting Prostitution
(1) A person is guilty of exploiting prostitution if he:
(a) procures an inmate for a house of prostitution or place in a
house of prostitution for one who would be an inmate;
(b) encourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes another
to become or remain a prostitute;
(c) transports a person into or within this state with a purpose
to promote that person's engaging in prostitution or procuring
or paying for transportation with that purpose;
(d) not being a child or legal dependent of a prostitute, shares
the proceeds of prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to their
understanding that he is to share therein; or
(e) owns, controls, manages, supervises, or otherwise keeps,
alone or in association with another, a house of prostitution or
a prostitution business.
(2) Exploiting prostitution is a felony of the third degree.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1602. Definitions
As used in this part:
(1) "Enterprise" means any individual, sole proprietorship,
partnership, corporation, business trust, association, or other legal
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as well as licit entities.
(2) "Pattern of unlawful activity" means engaging in conduct which
constitutes the commission of at least three episodes of unlawful
activity, which episodes are not isolated, but have the same or similar
purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics. Taken
together, the episodes shall demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct
and be related either to each other or to the enterprise. At least one of
the episodes comprising a pattern of unlawful activity shall have
occurred after July 31, 1981. The most recent act constituting part of a
pattern of unlawful activity as defined by this part shall have occurred
within five years of the commission of the next preceding act alleged
as part of the pattern.
(3) "Person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding a
legal or beneficial interest in property, including state, county, and
local governmental entities.
(4) "Unlawful activity" means to directly engage in conduct or to
solicit, request, command, encourage, or intentionally aid another
person to engage in conduct which would constitute any offense
described by the following crimes or categories of crimes, or to
attempt or conspire to engage in an act which would constitute any of
those offenses, regardless of whether the act is in fact charged or
indicted by any authority or is classified as a misdemeanor or a
felony:
...(aaaa) prostitution, Section 76-10-1302;

Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1603. Unlawful Acts
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds
derived, whether directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful
activity in which the person has participated as a principal, to use or
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of that income, or the proceeds
of the income, or the proceeds derived from the investment or use of
those proceeds, in the acquisition of any interest in, or the
establishment or operation of, any enterprise.
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of unlawful activity
to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control
of any enterprise.
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise to conduct or participate, whether directly or indirectly, in
the conduct of that enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful
activity.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any provision
of Subsection (1), (2), or (3).

Utah R. Crim. P. 4. Prosecution of Public Offenses
(a) Unless otherwise provided, all offenses shall be prosecuted by
indictment or information sworn to by a person having reason to
believe the offense has been committed.
(b) An indictment or information shall charge the offense for which
the defendant is being prosecuted by using the name given to the
offense by common law or by statute or by stating in concise terms
the definition of the offense sufficient to give the defendant notice of
the charge. An information may contain or be accompanied by a
statement of facts sufficient to make out probable cause to sustain the
offense charged where appropriate. Such things as time, place,
means, intent, manner, value and ownership need not be alleged
unless necessary to charge the offense. Such things as money,
securities, written instruments, pictures, statutes and judgments may
be described by any name or description by which they are generally
known or by which they may be identified without setting forth a
copy. However, details concerning such things may be obtained
through a bill of particulars. Neither presumptions of law nor matters
of judicial notice need be stated.
(c) The court may strike any surplus or improper language from an
indictment or information.
(d) The court may permit an indictment or information to be
amended at any time before verdict if no additional or different
offense is charged and the substantial rights of the defendant are not
prejudiced. After verdict, an indictment or information may be
amended so as to state the offense with such particularity as to bar a
subsequent prosecution for the same offense upon the same set of
facts.
(e) When facts not set out in an information or indictment are
required to inform a defendant of the nature and cause of the offense
charged, so as to enable him to prepare his defense, the defendant

may file a written motion for a bill of particulars. The motion shall be
filed at arraignment or within ten days thereafter, or at such later time
as the court may permit. The court may, on its own motion, direct the
filing of a bill of particulars. A bill of particulars may be amended or
supplemented at any time subject to such conditions as justice may
require. The request for and contents of a bill of particulars shall be
limited to a statement of factual information needed to set forth the
essential elements of the particular offense charged.
(f) An indictment or information shall not be held invalid because
any name contained therein may be incorrectly spelled or stated.
(g) It shall not be necessary to negate any exception, excuse or
proviso contained in the statute creating or defining the offense.
(h) Words and phrases used are to be construed according to their
usual meaning unless they are otherwise defined by law or have
acquired a legal meaning.
(i) Use of the disjunctive rather than the conjunctive shall not
invalidate the indictment or information.
(j) The names of witnesses on whose evidence an indictment or
information was based shall be endorsed thereon before it is filed.
Failure to endorse shall not affect the validity but endorsement shall
be ordered by the court on application of the defendant. Upon request
the prosecuting attorney shall, except upon a showing of good cause,
furnish the names of other witnesses he proposes to call whose names
are not so endorsed.
(k) If the defendant is a corporation, a summons shall issue directing
it to appear before the magistrate. Appearance may be by an officer
or counsel. Proceedings against a corporation shall be the same as
against a natural person.

Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e). Instructions
(e) Objections to written instructions shall be made before the
instructions are given to the jury. Objections to oral instructions may
be made after they are given to the jury, but before the jury retires to
consider its verdict. The court shall provide an opportunity to make
objections outside the hearing of the jury. Unless a party objects to an
instruction or the failure to give an instruction, the instruction may
not be assigned as error except to avoid a manifest injustice. In
stating the objection the party shall identify the matter to which the
objection is made and the ground of the objection.

Utah R. Evid. 606(b). Competency of Juror as Witness
(b) Inquiry Into Validity of Verdict or Indictment. Upon an
inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not
testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of
the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any
other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or
dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's
mental processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may
testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information
was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside
influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may a
juror's affidavit or evidence of any statement by the juror concerning
a matter about which the juror would be precluded from testifying be
received for these purposes.

ADDENDUM B
Trial Court's Ruling Denying Motion to Arrest Judgment

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

:

CASE NO. 061906590

:

S. STEVEN MAESE,

:

Defendant.

:

Judge Randall N. Skanchy

The Court has before it the defendant S. Steven Maese's
Maese") Motion for Arrest of Judgment and/or For a New Trial.

("Mr.
The

matters have been fully and extensively briefed and the parties argued
the matter before the Court on October 27, 2008.

The matter is now ready

for decision.
BACKGROUND
On July 11, 2008, after a two day jury trial, the jury returned
guilty verdicts against Mr. Maese in the above-entitled matter on the
following counts:
Count I - Pattern of Unlawful Activity, a Second Degree Felony
Counts II, III, IV, V - Exploiting Prostitution, Third Degree
Felonies
The jury acquitted Mr. Maese on Count VI, Money Launderinq, a Second
Degree Felony.

The charges arose as a result of Mr. Maese's ownership

and operation of an escort service named the "Doll House," which was a
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sexually oriented business, licensed in Park City, Summit County, Utah.1
The Doll House, however, under Mr. Maese's ownership, was operated out
of a residence in Cottonwood Heights, located in Salt Lake County, where
the co-owner of the business, Tiffany Curtis ("Ms. Curtis"), resided.
While the Doll House held itself out to be an escort service, the
overwhelming weight of evidence produced at trial indicated it provided
more client services than merely those associated with an escort service,
but rather services which included sex acts, and the owners, the escorts
and their clientele understood, or came to understand quite quickly, that
prostitution was a service the Doll House and its escorts provided, and
that anywhere from 50% to 90% of the Doll House customers fully expected
and received some type of sexual activity from a Doll House escort.
Legal Discussion

A.

Motion to Arrest Judgment
At the conclusion of the trial, and prior to sentencing, Mr. Maese

filed a Motion in Arrest of Judgment, or, in the Alternative, a Motion
for a New Trial.

Motions to arrest Judgment are governed by Utah Rule

of Criminal Procedure 23:
At any time prior to the imposition of sentence, the court
upon its own initiative may, or upon motion of a defendant

!

Mr. Maese owned the Doll House with his then girlfriend, Tiffany Curtis, who had
formerly worked as an escort, and had advised Mr. Maese about the "business" opportunities
associated with an escort service. The Doll House was licensed in Park City, and maintained a
small office there, but did no actual business from the Park City location.
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shall, arrest judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not
constitute a public offense, or the defendant is mentally ill,
or there is other good cause for the arrest of judgment....
Under Rule 23, a trial court should arrest Judgment if the evidence
presented by the State or admitted to by a defendant "is so inconclusive
or so inherently improbable as to an element of the crime that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt as to that element," that
is, if it is factually insufficient to support the jury's guilty verdict.
See, State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993) .

Thus, when Mr.

Maese attacks the jury's verdict for sufficiency of the evidence, or lack
of unanimity,

it may be considered under Rule 23 prior to being

sentenced. Mr. Maese urges the Court that it should arrest Judgment both
because of the alleged insufficiency of the evidence and the lack of
unanimity of the jury verdict.
B.

Motion for a New Trial2
Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth the basis

upon which a new trial may be granted.

The Court may grant a new trial

in the interest of justice if "there is any error or impropriety which
had a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party."

2

The State correctly notes that a Motion for New Trial should be filed after sentencing.
"Rule ?4(r.) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. While Mr. Maese concurs with the
State's assessment, he argues that Rule 23 permits a trial Court to exercise "wide discretion" in
any considerations for the arrest of judgment, and that his arguments may be considered for both.
This Court will consider all of the arguments of Mr. Maese without worrying whether the Motion
for a New Trial could be considered now or later.
SPPJ
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Mr. Maese urges the Court to grant him a new trial because of the
same two bases as set forth above, and various errors he ascribes to the
Court, including not ruling upon, or compelling the State, to provide a
bill of particulars, permitting evidence to be presented to the jury of
one

of

the escort's

non-consensual

sex

acts,

allowing

the

jury

to

consider four alternative statutory prongs as a basis for the Pattern of
Unlawful

Activity

charge,

permitting

the

introduction

of

a

letter

addressed to the parents of one of the escorts, penned by Mr. Maese, and
actions

or

remarks

by

the prosecutor

which

Mr. Maese

alleges

was

prosecutorial misconduct and which therefore prejudiced the trial.

Mr.

Maese alleges that any one of these issues had a ''substantial adverse
effect" upon his rights.

The Court will address each of these arguments

herein.
1.

Sufficient Evidence was Adduced by the State at Trial that Mr. Maese

is Guilty of the Counts Charged Beyond a Reasonable Doubt.
Notwithstanding the mountain of evidence provided at trial and the
jury's verdict of guilt, Mr. Maese now urges the Court that such evidence
was insufficient to convince a jury beyond a reasonable doubt of his
guilt.

In the face of this evidence, it is as if Mr. Maese is asking the

Court to look squarely into the brightness of an unobscured noonday sun
and then seek to persuade tne Court that the sun does noc exist.

Such

is the quantum of evidence provided at trial to support the jury verdict.

- Without
provided

at
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attempting
trial

which

to create an exhaustive
supports

the jury

list of the evidence

verdict

on each

of the

respective counts, the following is a summary of the evidence provided
at

trial

concerning

the nature

of the Doll

House's business

and the

knowledge of Mr. Maese about the purpose of the business.
(a)
Ms.

After creation of the Doll House as a business, Mr. Maese and

Curtis advertised it on a website which provided a link to a site

entitled "The Erotic Review," which was a national posting of reviews of
the places around the country where

"erotic" escorts, massages,

strip

clubs, and "gentlemen clubs" could be located and the various types of
"service" the clientele could expect from the individuals involved with
a business such as the Doll House.

(Trial Tr. Day 1 ("Tl") 16.)

Mr.

Maese put together the Doll House website, monitored the "reviews" his
escorts received

(Tl 84) , wrote his own fictitious reviews of the sexual

acts his escorts would perform for paying clients

(Tl 117) and discussed

bad reviews with the escorts to encourage them to generate
reviews

(Tl 114-15).

He specifically spoke to the escorts that refusing

sex was bad for business and would result in a bad review.
(b)
sent

(Tl 125-27)

The Doll House employed numerous women as escorts, w h o were

to various

appointments,

eomplr^t-e-ly naked,
created

"positive"

a

"Policy

in which

they were

required

to become

iT-rial Transcript Day 2 ("T2") 2 7 0 ) Whi1.fi Mr. Maese
&

Procedures

explicitly prohibited sexual acts,

Handbook"

for the Doll

it was understood

House

that

that sex w a s the
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This was certainly true as to the

owners, Mr. Maese and Ms. Curtis, who did all they could to make the Doll
House a successful and lucrative concern.

Financial success for an

escort and for the Doll House involved sexual activity.
(c)

Mr. Maese and Ms. Curtis often obtained the details of the

escort's individual appointments, including the following low lights:
(i)

one escort noted to Mr. Maese that during an appointment

where she performed oral sex the client "tasted" disgusting.

(Tl 87-88) ;

(ii) another escort complained to Mr. Maese that other escorts
were not charging enough for sex so clients were reluctant to pay her the
price she demanded for sex (Tl 103) , to which Mr. Maese told her that the
fee she charged for sex was too much.

3

(Tl 103, T2 187); and

A theme of Mr. Maese's defense was, that while escorts may have engaged in sex acts,
he was oblivious to such activity and he presumed the business was only providing escort
services that did not involve sex acts. Indeed, as part of his defense, Mr. Maese introduced
evidence at trial that he had drafted a "policy and procedure manual" that explained that sex acts
were not allowed by law or by the Doll House, and held at least two quarterly business meetings
where escorts were trained by a legal professional as to what legally could or could not be done
as an escort. As will be seen by a cursory review of the evidence, this was a facade, as the
evidence suggests Mr. Maese fully understood sex was part of the service the Doll House
provided, he actively participated in "marketing" the types of sexual activity individual escorts
would perform by creating fictitious reviews by supposed satisfied clientele, encouraged the
escorts to provide the sex acts the clients demanded, and demanded that his escorts satisfy the
clients and obtain "good" reviews from their clientele. The idea that sex acts were not permitted
is more appropriately called a "wink, wink" defense, wherein Mr. Maese tells an escort not to do
something, but fully expects them to do exactly that.
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(iii) Mr. Maese told the escorts to "keep the guys happy but
whatever happens between you guys is between you guys" (Tl 152-53);
(iv) Mr. Maese attended a bachelor party with two of his
escorts where oral sex was performed with clients. Mr. Maese accompanied
the escorts to the event and called the Doll House to report they had
arrived and collected the Doll House fee (Tl 97-98);
(v) Mr. Maese told an escort during a dispute with a "regular"
client over the fee for sexual intercourse that she was to go to a gas
station, purchase condoms and go back and make the guy happy because he
was a "regular." (T2 186);
(vi) An escort told Mr. Maese that she had performed oral sex
for $400 and Mr. Maese responded that for $400 she would need "to be a
little more liberal than that." (T2 235-36); and
(vii) In a dispute with an escort who left the Doll House to
work with a competitor, Mr. Maese drafted and sent a letter to the
escort's parents highlighting the sexual activities she had engaged in
while an escort at the Doll House, which letter included photographs and
the "reviews" she had received from The Erotic Review.
35)

(Tl 100-02, 133-
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(viii) Mr. Maese and Ms. Curtis referred to the escorts who
were willing to have sex with a client as "bailers" and/or that they
would uplay ball." (Testimony of Ms. Curtis)4
(ix) Mr. Maese was present at least 70% of the time when one
escort returned from appointments and paid the agency fee and was seen
by

this

escort

handling

and wrapping

the money

in rubber bands.

(Testimony of Allison H.) 5
(x) A typical escort would do three to four dates a day,
worked

a

5 0 hour

work

week

and

approximately 50% of the appointments.

engaged

in

sexual

activity

on

(Testimony of Jennifer H.)

(xi) One escort was involved in a non-consensual sex act from
a regular client and she informed Mr. Maese, and he responded that the
Doll House would never provide services to that client again.

(Testimony

of Heather T,)
(xii) The witnesses testified that from 30% to 90% of the
appointments

scheduled

by

the

Doll

House

involved

sexual

acts.

(Testimony of Allison H., Jennifer H. , Heather W. , Danielle T. , Allison
J.)

4

Where the Court cites to testimony rather than to a reference in the trial transcript, it is
b^Ga^se-the Court does not have a triaLtoanscri-ptand is relying on its own trial notes. Where a
trial transcript is referenced, it has been taken from the briefs of one of the litigants.
5

The witnesses who were escorts at the Doll House will be referred to in this Decision by
their first name and last initial.
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(xiii) Mr. Maese arranged some of the escort appointments with
clients and drove the escorts to the location.
(xiv)

In addition

to a Doll

(Testimony of Nicole F.)

House

fee

of

$95

for

each

appointment, the escorts paid Ms. Curtis, the appointment scheduler, a
"tip" of from ten to twenty percent of any additional money the escort
earned from engaging in sex acts, which was commingled with Doll House
fees.

(T2 222, 226).
(xv) The more

u

tip" Ms. Curtis and the Doll House received

from an escort, the more appointments the escort received.

(T2 149-50,

182)
(xvi) The Erotic Review, reviewed and supplemented by Mr.
Maese, detailed the sex acts the Doll House escorts performed.

(Tl 12-

16, 82-84, 114-115, 127)
(xvii) Mr. Maese checked the reviews of his escorts in The
Erotic Review daily and discussed with Ms. Curtis and the escorts their
respective reviews.

(Tl 84, 114-115, 117, 125-27)

(xviii) During the execution of a search warrant on the Doll
House, law enforcement discovered hard copies of The Erotic Review which
detailed the sexual repertoire of the Doll House escorts.

(Tl 23)

(xix) During the execution of a search warrant on the Doll
He-use,

law

e-nf oreemenrt

retrieved

escort

srhpHnlp

li^t-^f

p.sr.nrt.

appointment lists, business application for the Doll House signed by Mr.
Maese, and Doll House financial accounts signed by Mr. Maese, as well as
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financial records of money transfers from the Doll House to Mr. Maese's
personal financial account.
(xx) Mr. Maese

(Testimony of Detective Dan Bartlett)
and

Ms. Curtis

abandoned

the

quarterly

discussions with escorts about prohibitions against sex on appointments
because they "did not want the girls to think that they would get in
trouble...if they were to have sex on an appointment."

(Tl 72-80)

(xxi) In a meeting with all the escorts, Mr. Maese went over
The Erotic Review, and encouraged the escorts to work harder, provide
more "services" for less money and generate better reviews so the Doll
House could become the best escort service in Salt Lake City.

(Testimony

of Allison J.)
(xxii) Mr. Maese spoke to one escort on strategies to employ
to avoid getting busted for illegal sexual activity.

(Testimony of

Jennifer H.)
(xxiii) The escorts felt pressure to provide sex on their
appointments from the Doll House owners.

(Testimony of Jennifer H.)

* * *

When a Court is asked to review a jury verdict on the grounds that
the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict, the Court is to:
...review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably
be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of
-the—jury.
We—reverse—a—jury—conviction—for—insufficient
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime of which he was convicted.
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State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232; 236 (Utah 1992) (quoting State v.
Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985).)
As set forth in this Court's summary recitation of the evidence,
there is nothing insufficient or inconclusive in the evidence the State
presented of Mr. Maese's guilt to support his conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt. Evidence of guilt is sufficient when a jury, based on
the evidence, may find beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant
committed the charged offenses. State v. Murphy, 617 P. 2d 399, 402 (Utah
1980) . Each piece of evidence does not need to be sufficient, in and of
itself, to support a jury finding of guilt. State v. Gurr, 904 P. 2d 238,
241-42 (Utah App. 1995).

Rather, a court is to review the evidence in

its totality to determine whether the totality of facts is sufficient to
support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
In Gurr, the defendant argued that his conviction was not supported
by sufficient evidence.

id. at 240.

To support his arguments, he

isolated each piece of evidence presented by the prosecution, arguing
that each by itself was insufficient to convict him.

I_d. at 242.

The

court rejected his arguments stating, "Although Gurr offers alternative
explanations for pieces of the evidence, those explanations would require
us to view the evidence as individual still frames rather than a whole
moving picture. " XcL.
Mr. Maese is asking this Court to engage in the same limited view
of each piece of evidence against him.

But viewing the evidence in its
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that Mr. Maese knew the

escorts

working for him were performing sex acts for money, that he accepted
money

they

received

from the work,

prostitute themselves.

and

that he

encouraged

them to

Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1305, provides that a

person may be found guilty of exploiting prostitution if he:
(a) procures an inmate for a house of prostitution or place in
a house of prostitution...;
(b) encourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes another
to become or remain a prostitute;
(c) transports a person...within this state with a purpose to
promote that person engaging in prostitution...;
(d) ...shares the proceeds of prostitution with a prostitute
pursuant to their understanding that he is to share therein;
or
(e) owns, controls, manages, supervises, or otherwise keeps,
alone or in association with another, a house of prostitution
or a prostitution business.
In the face of the quantum of evidence presented at trial it is an
impossible task for Mr. Maese to argue that the quantum of evidence is
insufficient or inconclusive as to his guilt.

The impossibility of that

task is only highlighted by each of the pieces of evidence Mr. Maese
tries to explain away.

Indeed, from Mr. Maese7 s own marshaling of the

evidence and arguments thereon, one may conclude that:
(i) Mr. Maese encouraged an escort who was unwilling to have
unprotected sex to go get some condoms, work it out and make "the guy
happy."

Exploitation of Prostitution may be proven by encouraging,

inducing or causing a person to become or remain a prostitute;
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(ii) Unhappy with a different escort who left the Doll House,
Mr. Maese sent a letter to her parents detailing her sexual activity as
an escort for the Doll House. Exploitation of Prostitution may be proven
by the ownership, control or management of a prostitution business;
(iii) Mr. Maese received proceeds from a sexual encounter by
a Doll House escort for which she was forced to perform a sexual act for
less than she demanded, and received money from the escorts from their
appointments.

Exploitation of Prostitution may be shown by the sharing

of proceeds of prostitution.
(iv) Mr. Maese maintained a house of prostitution by setting
up a website, handling advertisements, writing reviews of his escorts on
The Erotic Review which contained information about sexual activity.
Exploitation

of

Prostitution

may

be

shown

by

owning,

controlling,

managing or supervising a prostitution business.
Furthermore, the "low lights" list of activity stated above, the
State provided

sufficient

and conclusive evidence

to support

claims

against Mr. Maese for exploiting prostitution, including the following*.
(a) Procuring an individual to enaaae in -prostitution :
Mr. Maese interviewed, photographed, hired, trained and advertised for
the Doll House escorts.

Without exception, each of the escorts were

interviewed and—-hir^ed by Mr^—Macsc .

Gnc escort was drawn to th-a—Doll

House for employment by an ad she saw for the Doll House in a weekly
newspaper.

(Testimony of Allison J.)
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(b) Encouraging another to Become or Remain a Prostitute:
Mr.

Maese

coached

the escorts

on what

they could

do to avoid

being

busted, he discussed their Erotic Reviews and encouraged better service
for less money, commented on their pricing for sexual services if he felt
it was too much or if they needed to provide more service for the price
received, told them to keep their customers satisfied, and operated a
business that gave the escorts referrals based on how much of a tip the
Doll House received for the sexual activity of its escorts.
(c) Transports a person with purpose to promote prostitution:
Mr.

Maese

drove

escorts

to several

appointments,

at one of which

he

remained to take photographs.
(d) Shares in proceeds of prostitution: Mr. Maese and the Doll
House collected tips from sexual activity of his escorts along with the
standard agency fees.
(e) Owned or controlled a prostitution business

: M r . Maese

owned, operated and oversaw the business operation of the Doll House.
After a review of the evidence, this Court concludes that the jury
had sufficient

and conclusive evidence as to the counts of Exploiting

Prostitution to find Mr. Maese guilty on those charges.

There is neither

good cause to arrest the Judgment nor any error or impropriety that had
a—s-ubs-feantial—adverse—e-f-fect
trial.

upon Mr.—Ma-ese' s—rights—to

warrant—a new
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As to the charge of Pattern of Unlawful Activity, those same facts
support

this

Court's

conclusion

that

the

jury

had

sufficient

and

conclusive evidence as to the count for a Pattern of Unlawful Activity.
2.

Mr. Maese Received a Unanimous Verdict From the Jury
Mr. Maese seeks to introduce evidence of jurors' statements that

they were

confused during

deliberations by the Court's

instructions

regarding the specific acts that constitute Exploitation of Prostitution
and their duty of returning a unanimous verdict.
Mr. Maese argues that his verdict was not a unanimous verdict from
the jury as three jurors expressed some confusion during deliberations
concerning the jury instructions as it related to what specific acts may
be

found by the jury

in order

to return a verdict

on a count

of

Exploitation of Prostitution.
As previously noted, one may be guilty of Exploiting Prostitution
under five alternative categories of the crime.
(a)

They include:

procuring an inmate for a house of prostitution;

(b) encourages, induces, or otherwise purposely causes another
to become or remain a prostitute;
(c) transports a person into or within this state, with

the

purpose to promote that person's engaging in prostitution...;
(d) nuL beiny d. child or legal dependent of a-p-restitutc chare
the proceeds of prostitution...; or

STATE V. MAESE

PAGE 16

MEMORANDUM DECISION

(e) owns, controls, manages supervises or otherwise keeps,
alone or in association with another, a house of prostitution

or a

prostitution business.
Utah Code Ann., § 76-10-1305 (1953, as amended.)
During the jury deliberations, the jurors sent out the following
question in referring to the elements section of the instruction on
Exploiting Prostitution:
Jury Question: In instruction #37, a, b, c, d, do all of them
have to be fulfilled in order to find the defendant guilty or
just one of the conditions met? Also the same question for
instruction #40.
The Court, after consultation with respective counsel submitted the
following:
Answer: Both instructions 37 and 40's subparagraphs (the a, b,
C s) you refer to end with the word "or" and therefore should
be read accordingly.
Mr. Maese's argument is that the jury may have found him guilty on
different categories of the offense, but not unanimously on the same
category.

Mr. Maese's argument is unpersuasive both based on the Utah

Rules of Evidence and on case law.
(i) Utah Rule of Evidence 606 Precludes Consideration of Juror Statements
Utah Rule of Evidence 606(b) forbids the use of juror statements Mr.
Maese gathered as to matters occurring during deliberations. Rule 606(b)
states in part:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment,

a juror

may not

testify

as

to

any

matter

or

statement
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during

occurring

the

course

of

the

jury's

deliberations.
..except that a juror may testify on the
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was
improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any
outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any
juror.
Nor may a juror's affidavit or evidence of any
statement by the juror concerning a matter about which the
juror would be precluded from testifying be received for these
purposes.
(Emphasis added.)
Utah law is clear as to the strictness of this rule.
498 P.2d

662, 665-66

(Utah 1972)

See,

State v.

Gee,

(specifying that juror testimony or

affidavits may not be received to impeach the jury verdict) . All of the
statements provided by defense counsel allude to matters and statements
which

occurred

deliberations.

and

were

made

during

the

course

of

the

jury's

Therefore, they may not be received for the purposes of

impeaching the verdict in seeking a new trial.
Rule 606(b) allows for consideration of juror testimony only to the
extent

that

it

may

suggest

information7' in deliberations.

the

entry

of

"extraneous

prejudicial

The mere fact that several jurors were

confused as to their duty of unanimity as to a specific crime and as to
each element of that crime does not qualify as extraneous prejudicial
information

or

improper

influence

for

admission

under

Rule

606(b),

especially where that confusion was specifically addressed by the trial
court and resolved.

The Utah Supreme court has expressly held:

TIT—a—long—3r±ire—of—decisions—in—thirs—jurisdiction, the
principle has been firmly established that evidence by
affidavit or testimony of a juror will not be received to
impeach or question the jury verdict or to show the grounds

upon which it was rendered, or to show their

misunderstanding-
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they misunderstood

the charge

of

the

court,
or the effect of their verdict, or their opinions,
surmises and processes of reasoning in arriving at a verdict.
State v. Gee, supra
Simons,

551

P.2d

at 665-66
515,

516

(emphasis added) ; see also, Johnson v.
(Utah

1976)

(refusing

juror

affidavits

indicating that jury was confused as to law stated in instructions) . The
introduction of such evidence is expressly barred by Rule 606(b) and by
the clear statements of the Utah Supreme Court.
(ii) Utah Case Law Precludes Consideration of Juror Statements
Mr. Maese cites Resolution Trust Cory,

v. Stone, 998 F.2d 1534, 1548

(10th Cir. 1993), for the proposition that Federal Rule 606(b) is silent
as to questioning the jury to confirm the accuracy of the verdict, and
therefore

should

not

preclude

miscommunication of the verdict.

the

testimony

as

to

a

potential

The Utah version of Rule 606(b) also

does not specifically preclude evidence of verdict miscommunication.
However, case law is clear that juror testimony may not be used to
impeach or question the verdict or to show a misunderstanding of law or
fact or the charge of the court.

State v. Gee, 498 P. 2d 662, 665-66

(Utah 1972) . The Utah Supreme Court has held that in general jurors must
agree only to the crime charged, not a particular theory of the crime.
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987).

In Tillman, the Court noted

chat there are two classes or criminal statutes: fa) where uhere is one"
crime with various means to commit the crime, and (b) where the statute
sets forth several acts, and commission of each is a separate crime.
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When the statute is (a) above (like the one at issue here) , the jury need
only come to consensus about the crime itself, not the elements of the
crime.

Id.

In State v. Russell, 733 P.2d 162, 165 (Utah 1987) the Utah

Supreme Court noted that:
Many jurisdictions have considered the scope of the
constitutional requirement of a unanimous jury verdict in
criminal cases. The decisions are virtually unanimous that a
defendant is not entitled to a unanimous verdict on the
precise manner in which the crime was committed, or by which
of several alternative methods or modes, or under which
interpretation of the evidence so long as there is substantial
evidence to support each of the methods, modes, or manners
charged.
Thus, if the statute under which the defendant is convicted defines one
crime which may be committed several different ways, the defendant is not
entitled to jury unanimity on the way in which the crime was committed.
State v. Russell, Id. at 166.
Such is the case here.

Clearly there was sufficient evidence that

the jury could rely upon to find that Mr. Maese (a) procured individuals
to engage in prostitution or

(b) encouraged individuals to become or

remain prostitutes or (c) transported a person within the state to engage
in prostitution or
owned

a

(d) shared in proceeds of prostitution and/or (e)

prostitution

business,

as

has

been

previously

discussed.

Accordingly, Mr. Maese's Motion to Arrest Judgment and for a New Trial
based on allegations of lae-k of ju-pe-r^-un^n-imjrty fails.
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(iii) Even if the Jurors7 Statements are Considered, the Jury Requested
and Received a Clarification as to the Court's Instructions, Curing Any
Confusion and Preserving Mr. Maese's Right to a Unanimous Verdict
The Utah Supreme Court has held that juries are presumed to have
relied on instructions given by the Court.

See, State v. Harmon, 956

P.2d 262 (Utah 1998) . Mr. Maese asserts that after the jury received the
clarification instruction from the Court "they immediately returned a
guilty verdict on all four counts of Exploiting Prostitution.'' This, Mr.
Maese argues, is evidence that the jury "violated [his] constitutional
right to a unanimous verdict."
In this case, the statements of three jurors as to the specific acts
that may have constituted the counts of Exploitation of Prostitution is
argued to have caused some confusion during the deliberations.

However,

the jury brought those questions to the Court, and the Court responded
by clarifying the instruction that had previously been given.

This

response was considered and approved by counsel before returned to the
jury.6

"If a trial judge could not correct errors as they occur, few

trials would be successfully concluded."

Harmon, 956 P.2d at 272.

Court in this case offered a corrective instruction.

The

It is presumed

under Utah law that it is that clarifying instruction which the jury

6

While Mr. Maese's counsel acknowledges that he reviewed the answer to the jury
question, he does not acknowledge that he "approved" it. There is no record however to suggest
that Mr. Maese's counsel objected to the answer or proposed an alternative instruction.
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followed in rendering their verdict, not some suggestion of personal
confusion related by a juror that preceded this instruction.
3.

Mr. Maese Fails to Demonstrate that the Lack of a Ruling on a Bill

of Particulars Prejudiced Him
Before the Court discusses the argument, a procedural history of
this

case bears

some discussion.

The Information

in this case was

originally filed October 4, 2006, and Amended on October 5, 2006.

The

Amended Information contained a Probable Cause Statement which detailed
over the course of three pages the allegations supporting the criminal
counts brought against Mr. Maese.
After preliminary proceedings the Court set a jury trial for January
9-11,

2008,

represented

with
at

a pretrial

on December

17, 2007.

Mr. Maese

these proceedings by an attorney different

attorney who eventually handled his trial in July of 2008.

than

was
the

On January

7, 2008, approximately ten days before the beginning of the scheduled
jury trial, the parties stipulated to a cancellation of the jury trial
and the trial was reset for February 20 and 21, with a pretrial on
February 11, 2008.
before the second
moved,

On February 11, 2008, at the pretrial, nine days
time this matter was scheduled for trial, Mr. Maese

through his counsel, to continue the trial, which Motion was

granted.

The trial was reset for a third time on

a pretrial on April 14, 2008.

April 2J, 2XJXTS~, wiuh

At the pretrial on April 14, 2008, Mr.

Maese's counsel indicated that he was prepared to go to trial on April

STATE V. MAESE
23, 2008.

PAGE 22

MEMORANDUM DECISION

However, on the first day of trial, April 23, 2008, Mr. Maese

asked to discharge his lawyer, at which point the Court granted his
counsel's Motion to Withdraw and assessed Mr. Maese costs for the 35
jurors and seven witnesses who were prepared to appear on that day.
Thereafter, Mr. Athay, Mr. Maese's new trial counsel, made his record of
appearance and the matter was thereafter set for its fourth jury trial
setting on July 10 and 11, 2008, with a pretrial on July 7, 2008.
Thereafter, Mr. Maese filed a Motion for a Bill of Particulars,
which was briefed by the parties and argued at the pretrial conference
three days before the jury trial was to begin on its fourth setting.

At

this pretrial conference additional argument was heard by the Court on
a Motion to Disqualify the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office
for their prosecution in the matter, which Motion was filed four days
before the pretrial conference, and seven days before the trial was to
begin.

At the pretrial, after hearing arguments from the parties, the

Court indicated it would render a written opinion on the pending Motions
prior to the scheduled trial three days later.

On that same day, July

7, 2008, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision and Order which denied
the defendant's Motion to Disqualify the District Attorney's Office and
indicated to the parties that "the trial will proceed as scheduled."
(Memorandum Decision and Order, July 7, 2000.)—The Court did not includ-ein that Memorandum Decision any reference to Mr. Maese's Motion for a
Bill of Particulars, and on the day of trial, after asking both the State
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and Mr. Maese if they were ready to proceed with the trial, which both
affirmed they were, the trial commenced.

The Court never issued a

decision on Mr. Maese7s Motion for a Bill of Particulars.
Mr. Maese argues that the Court's failure to rule on his Motion for
a Bill of Particulars caused him prejudice by depriving him of the
opportunity to prepare an adequate defense.
(i) Mr. Maese waived his right to a ruling on the Motion for a Bill
of Particulars.
Rule 12(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that UA
motion made before trial shall be determined before trial unless the
court for good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for later
determination.7'

Rule 12 further provides in subsection

(f) that,

"Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to
make requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the
court shall constitute waiver thereof, but the court for cause shown may
grant relief from such waiver."

When the Court asked Mr. Maese on the

day of trial if they were ready to proceed, and received an affirmative
response, Mr. Maese effectively waived his right to obtain a ruling on
his Motion for a Bill of Particulars by failing to object to the trial
proceeding or to otherwise request the Court to issue its opinion before
the trial began.

Indeed, Mr. Maese should well have known than hi~s

Motion for a Bill of Particulars had been denied when the trial actually
began.
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(ii) Mr. Maese suffered no adverse effect for lack of a Ruling on
his Motion for a Bill of Particulars.
a.

The Amended Information Provided Adequate Notice of the Charges

Against Mr. Maese
Article I Section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides that an
accused "shall have the right...to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him...."

Utah Code Ann., further provides in § 77-14-

1 that the State provide an accused in writing

u

As is known to him the

place, date and time of the commission of the offense charged."

In

interpreting the obligation of the State, the Utah Supreme Court has held
that one

n

be charged with a specific crime, so that he can know the

particulars of the alleged wrongful conduct...."
P.2d 260, 262 (Utah 1985).

State v. Burnett, 712

Mr. Maese's Motion for a Bill of Particulars

sought the particulars of Counts II through V of the Amended Information,
the Exploitation of Prostitution charges.
Mr. Maese's claim that he was prejudiced by not receiving a ruling
by the Court on his Bill of Particulars is not persuasive.
not

Mr. Maese was

deprived of the opportunity to provide an adequate defense. The

Amended Information provided three pages, and nine separate subparagraphs
detailing the particulars of the crime charged. It provides in paragraph
5, the following:
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(a) an escort with initials N.F. was told by Mr. Maese the
type of sex acts she should perform with a client during July
and September, 2005, and further that she was told in response
to a request for sex by a client to work it out;
(b) an escort with initials A.F. was encouraged by Mr. Maese
during October and December 2005 to engage in oral sex without
a condom and that if she didn't engage in sex acts she would
not get work;
(c) an escort with initials H.R. discussed with Maese between
September, 2005 and February, 2006, what to do if she was
charged with Prostitution because of her sexual intercourse
with Doll House clients;
(d) an escort with initials J.H. paid Mr. Maese the Doll House
fee after sex with clients;
(e) an escort with
April and May 2006
sex acts to udrive
and work something

initials D.T. was told by Mr. Maese during
in a dispute with a client over a fee for
down the hill and get condoms and go back
out."

(f) an escort named T.N. told Mr. Maese during the year 2005
and 2006 of the specific sex acts she and the other escorts
performed.
In addition to the particulars set forth in the Amended Information,
Mr. Maese had already been through a preliminary hearing in which dates,
places

and times

of the alleged

illegal

conduct

had

occurred.

In

addition, Mr. Maese, over the almost two years of pendency of

this

litigation, had received the State's discovery, which included statements
and interviews of the escort witnesses who would be testifying against
him.
Before Mr. Maese can prevail on his argument that the lack of a
Court ruling on his Motion for a Bill of Particulars warrants a new
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trial, he must show that the failure prejudiced him by depriving him of
the opportunity to prepare an adequate defense.
Procedure

3 0 provides

in

subsection

(a)

that

Utah Rules of Criminal
"Any

error,

defect,

irregularity or variance which does not affect the substantial rights of
a party shall be disregarded."
For an error to affect the substantial rights of Mr. Maese, he must
show that absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood that the
result would have been more favorable to the defendant.

State v. Knight,

734 P.2d 913 (Utah 1987); see also, State v. Bernards, 2007 UT App. 238,
166 P.3d 626.

This has been interpreted as the "erosion of confidence"

test and requires a two-part analysis:

First, did the error impede the

defendant's ability to prepare for trial?
impede

his

ability

to prepare

a* defense

Second, did the error so
that

the

likelihood

of a

different outcome was sufficiently high as to undermine the confidence
in the verdict?

Id. at 920.

Neither can be met here.

Generally, Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 3 0 puts the burden on the
defendant to show prejudicial error.

See, State v. Blubauah, 904 P. 2d

688 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (court denied Motion where the accused made np
showing that further detail would've made any difference in the trial)/
State v. Swapp, 808 P. 2d 241 (Utah 1991) (defendant did not show how his
defense—wa-s—prejudiced—by—fefee—lack—e-f—knowledge-;—he—made—only—aconclusory statement that it was difficult to defend) . However, courts
have found that the burden should shift to the State when it comes to a
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The State must show that there is no

reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, the outcome of the trial
would have favored the defendant.

See, State v. Knight, 734 P. 2d 913

(Utah 1987); State v. Bell, 770 P.2d 100, 104 (Utah 1998).
Even if this Court erred in failing to rule on the defendant's
Motion for a Bill of Particulars, such an error does not warrant a new
trial because it did not "affect the substantial rights of a party." Utah
Rule of Criminal Procedure 30(a).

Put differently, because it is clear

from the record that Mr. Maese was not entitled to a bill of particulars,
any

failure

to issue

an Order denying

such bill

of particulars

is

rendered harmless.
In State v. Ramirez , 817 P.2d 774, 778

(Utah 1991), a decision

heavily relied upon by Mr. Maese, the trial court did not explicitly rule
on a Motion to Suppress which it had taken under advisement.

In that

case, however, the failure to issue a ruling on the Motion was harmful
error because during the suppression hearing, there were numerous factual
discrepancies among the testimony of the State's witnesses which were
never ruled upon, and the appellate court was not able to resolve these
factual discrepancies on its own upon appeal.

.Id. at 787.

Because of

the factual discrepancies and the court's failure to resolve them, it was
not:—clear whether Ramirez wa^ entitled-to have the evidence against him
suppressed.

Id. at 788.

In turn, the court was required to reverse his
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conviction and order a new trial because this was "harmful error."

Id.

at 789.
The case before this Court is different. Unlike the hearing on the
Motion

to Suppress

in Ramirez, there was no evidentiary hearing

consider in this case, and no factual discrepancies to consider.
only

issue

sufficient

before
notice

this

Court

through

was

whether

the Amended

Mr.

Maese

Information's

had

to
The

received

probable

cause

statement, and the evidence the State provided to him through discovery
and a preliminary hearing as to what the charges were against him and the
underlying evidence to support those charges, a finding the Court could
make based upon the record.
The record shows that the Amended Information charging Mr. Maese was
constitutionally sufficient.
Ct.

App.

2007),

the

In State v. Bernards, 166 P.3d 626

court

explained

that

an

(Utah

Information

is

constitutionally sufficient if it fully apprises the defendant of the
"State's evidence upon which the charge is based."

I_d.

The court added

that a *[l]ack of factual specificity" does not make an Information
constitutionally deficient.

Further, specific dates are not necessary

when a count is part of an ongoing criminal enterprise.

Ld. at %% 6, 18.

The probable cause statement included with the Amended Information and
tire—evidence the State provides—bo the defendant must be considered a-spart of the notice to the defendant.

id. at % 17.

In Bernards, the

defendant was charged with five counts of Aggravated Sexual Abuse of a
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stepdaughter

September 2000 and January 23, 2008."

continuously

Id. at ff 2, 4.

cause statement described the evidence of each count.

"between

The probable

Id. at % 5.

Even

though two of the counts for which he was convicted provided a range of
dates-- Muring the first part of 2002" and "December 2002" the court held
Bernards received sufficient notice because the abuse was part of a
continuing criminal enterprise, the probable cause statement described
the evidence for each count, and the State provided him with video and
cassette tapes of interviews with the victim and transcripts of the
interviews.

Id. at ^

2, 17-18.

As happened in Bernards, Mr. Maese received sufficient notice. The
four counts of Exploiting Prostitution for which Mr. Maese sought a Bill
of Particulars gives a date range—like the Information in Bernards — of
July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, and the probable cause statement
outlines the evidence the State used to charge him--just like the
probable cause statement in Bernards.
Moreover, the probable cause statement in this case gave the
initials of former escorts, the dates during which they worked for Mr.
Maese, and detailed accounts that as they worked for Mr. Maese they were
expected to perform sex acts with their clients, and that Mr. Maese
encGUidCjed them in Lliuse enterprises.

The Amended Information was more

than sufficient to identify the witnesses against him and review the
evidence occurring during their respective employment with the Doll
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Further, the State provided Mr. Maese with all the evidence it

intended to use against him m
statements.
Hearing m

response to discovery, including witness

Furthermore, Mr. Maese had the benefit of a Preliminary
which those charges had been more fully laid out.

Mr. Maese received constitutionally sufficient notice through the
Amended Information, the probable cause statement, and the preliminary
hearing, and the evidence the State provided to him.
impeded m
charges

Mr. Maese was not

his preparation for trial by a lack of specificity as to the

against him, nor would the outcome have been any different.

Unlike the scenario m

Ramirez, there is no risk of harm to Mr. Maese

because that finding is based upon the record.

Mr. Maese 7 s notion that

a new trial would somehow act as a remedy is faulty reasoning because
there is no unresolved factual issue to alter the case--only an unstated
legal ruling which Mr. Maese's counsel himself waived the morning of
trial, by indicating he was ready to proceed to try the case.
4.
Mr.

Mr. Maese had Adequate Notice of Pattern of Unlawful Activity
Maese argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the

Amended Information referred to subsections 1, 2 and 3 of the statutory
provisions for this offense, but not subsection 4, and that the 3ury
instruction referred to all four subsections,7 thus not permitting Mr.

7

The Amended Information charges Mr Maese with a violation of Utah Code Ann., § 7610-1603(3), but m its body continued with a recital of subsections 1, 2 and 3. The recital omits
subsection 4
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Maese to be prepared to defend against such a charge.

Subsection 4 of

the statute provides that uit is unlawful for any person to conspire to
violate any provision of Subsection (1), (2) or (3)."
As previously noted in reference to Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure
30(a);

any variance

in the

Information

"which

does not

substantial rights of a party shall be disregarded."
at 2 62.

affect

the

Burnett, 712 P. 2d

Thus, Mr. Maese must show that the variance prevented him from

having notice of the charge and hindered his ability to defend against
the charge.

State v. Kiraan, 712 P.2d 240, 242 (Utah 1985).

Here the Amended Information makes specific reference to subsections
(1) , (2) and (3) and, while not making a specific reference to the number
(4),

sets

forth

the

conspiracy

nature

of

the

charge.

The

Amended

Information alleges that the parties conspired to undertake the illegal
activities as outlined in subsections 1-3 and further sets forth that
pursuant to such conspiracy the defendants exploited prostitution.

Mr.

Maese received notice of the charge of conspiracy as part of a Pattern
of Unlawful Activity and the variance in the charging document did not
affect a substantial right of Mr. Maese.
5.

The Admission of Testimony Regarding a Sexual Assault was

Probative and Non-Prejudicial
Mr. Maese argues that the Court improperly admitted evidence during
the trial that one of his escorts had been the victim of a sexual assault
during a specific appointment as a Doll House escort.

Mr. Maese argues
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that the inclusion of such evidence was prejudicial to him as it was not
relevant, and painted

u

him as a party to the rape, after the fact."

Throughout the trial Mr. Maese's defense theory was that while sexual
activity may have taken place between his escorts . and Doll

House

clientele, he was wholly unaware of it. Thus, evidence of a conversation
between Mr. Maese and an escort about sexual activity occurring during
the course of a Doll House appointment was highly relevant and probative
on the issue of whether Mr. Maese knew that his escorts were engaging in
sexual activity on their appointments with Doll House clients, and that
the

fees and tips the Doll House received were from prostitution

activities.

The evidence adduced at trial was that a regular customer

of the Doll House expected sex during his appointment with an escort, and
paid for his non-consensual sex with the escort and that the Doll House
shared in the proceeds.

Thus, the evidence was relevant and probative

and not unfairly prejudicial.

Furthermore, the record was replete that

Mr. Maese did not engage in that act nor condone the non-consensual
nature

of

the

authorities.

act

and

further

offered

to report

the matter

to

(Testimony of Heather T.)

Even if the evidence was admitted erroneously, it was harmless.
Even without

the testimony of this particular event, there

is no

reasonable likelihood Lhac—Lhe uuLcotue o£—the case would have been any
different, given the volume of testimony adduced at trial.

This Court

finds that there was no substantial adverse effect UDon Mr. Maese's
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rights to warrant a new trial, and no good cause to arrest Judgment.
Accordingly, Mr. Maese's Motion to Arrest Judgment and/or Motion for New
Trial is denied.
6.

The Admission of the Allison J. Letter was Probative and Not Unfairly

Prejudicial
Mr. Maese argues that the admission of the letter he drafted to
Allison J.'s

parents accusing her of being a prostitute was irrelevant

and unfairly prejudicial, and was evidence of other wrongs and therefore
should require an Arrest of Judgment or New Trial.

Again, the Court

notes that Mr. Maese's defense was grounded upon the premise that he was
not aware of the prostitution his escorts were engaged m . Thus to now
argue that the admission of a letter, penned m

his own hand, informing

the parents of one of his former escorts, that their daughter was engaged
m

prostitution while m

his employment is not relevant to the issue

before the Court is specious.

It is relevant and not unduly prejudicial.

Furthermore, the admission of such a letter was not offered as
evidence of any pertinent trait of character of Mr. Maese, although it
certainly tells a person about the nature of a person who would do such
a thing over an employment dispute.
action m

The letter was not offered to show

conformity with a cnaracter trait of Mr. Maese, but rather to

demonstrate Mr. Maese's knowledge that Doll House escorts provided sex
acts m

exchange for money.

To this end the letter detailed the conduct

Allison J. engaged in while an escort of the Doll House and contained
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reviews from The Erotic Review which included detailed descriptions of
the sex acts she was willing to engage in for a fee as a Doll House
escort.

The letter further corroborated the testimony of Allison J. and

other Doll House escorts that Mr. Maese was aware of the revenue Allison
J. could generate for the Doll House and what exactly she had to do to
generate that income.

Accordingly, the letter's probative value was not

substantially outweighed by whatever prejudicial effect it may have had
for Mr. Maese.

Accordingly, Mr. Maese's Motion to Arrest Judgment/New

Trial is denied as to this issue.
7.

The State Did Not Violate Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal

Procedure
Rule

16 of

requirements

the Utah Rules of Criminal

Procedure

outlines

of a prosecutor in disclosing to the defense

evidence obtained

in the prosecution of a case.

the

specified

The obligation to

produce such information is contingent upon request by a defendant and
is a continuing obligation which requires a prosecutor to disclose newly
acquired information.

State v. Kallin, 877 P.2d 138, 143 (Utah 1994).

The issue Mr. Maese raises here is whether he received complete
information from the State as a result of testimony elicited either at
trial or contained in the Amended Information's probable cause statement
tor which no interview or notes o£ such material was allegedly provided.
Those areas include:

(a)
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in the probable cause statement

of the Amended

Information attributed to Nicole F. that said uB*tch, you are
gonna have to make it work";
(b)

reference to trial testimony from Ms. Curtis that an escort
named Tatiana told Mr. Maese and Ms. Curtis about explicit sex
acts

and

another

incident

wherein

Mr. Maese

attended

a

bachelor party where Doll House escorts provided sex acts to
the celebrants.
The State responded by alleging that it supplied all material it had
related to statements it received from Nicole F. and that while a summary
of an interview of Nicole F. in the probable cause statement prepared by
Detective

Dan Bartlett

("Detective Bartlett")

does not

contain

the

statement alleged to have been made by Nicole F., that statement "or one
substantially similar" is in the video recording of Nicole F.'s interview
with

Detective Bartlett, and that that video recorded

interview was

provided to Mr. Maese 7 s counsel before trial. Accordingly, the Court
finds

no

merit

in

Mr.

Maese's

argument

that

the

State

withheld

information from him on this issue.
As to Ms. Curtis' statements, the State points to specific datestamped

documents

that

make

specific

conducted by Doll House escorts.

mention

of

bachelor

parties

The Sl&ce luiLhei notes—that—che mere

fact that a witness may testify at trial to something does not suggest
that the State knew of such testimony before trial and failed to disclose
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It is not uncommon for witnesses to provide statements at trial

never made in interviews with counsel before trial. The State represents
it never interviewed an escort of the Doll House named Tatiana, nor did
they interview Ms. Curtis about Tatiana.

Accordingly, the Court finds

no merit in Mr. Maese's argument on this point.
Mr. Maese fails to provide a basis for this Court to conclude that
the State withheld any information in violation of Rule 16.
8.

The State Did Not Engage in Prosecutorial Misconduct by Drawing

Reasonable

Inferences

From the Evidence and Questioning Mr. Maese 7 s

Credibility
Mr. Maese

argues

that

the prosecutor

in this

case

engaged

in

misconduct in his closing argument by arguing that Heather T. transferred
money to Mr. Maese from an incident of non-consensual sex and that Mr.
Maese's testimony in the area of "compliance" meetings with Doll House
escorts was not credible.
(a) Reasonable Inference
A

prosecutor

may

draw reasonable

inferences

adduced at trial and argue them to the jury.
799 (Utah 1999) .

from

the

evidence

State v. Bakalov, 979 P. 2d

The State noted in its argument that Heather T. never

actually said that she paid Mr. Maese the agency fee for the incident,
but

that

it is a reasonable

inference which can be drawn from

the

STATE V. MAESE
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Several witnesses, including Heather T., testified that Mr.

Maese and Ms. Curtis routinely received $95 for every appointment a Doll
House escort handled and typically a tip on top of that.

Heather T.

testified that after she was sexually assaulted, she received $300 or
$400 as a tip, and also collected an agency fee.

She testified that she

returned back to the Doll House immediately after the assault.

It was

reasonable to infer from this testimony that she paid a Doll House fee
for the appointment.

Further, Heather T. testified that "when we would

return from the appointment we would go and meet back up with Tiffany and
Steve, we would give them the agency fee which was at least $100, . . .and
then the tip we would give to Tiffany because she is the phone person."
(See T2 at 166.)

Therefore, it was a reasonable inference that could be

drawn from the testimony, and argued to the jury.

The Court finds no

merit in Mr. Maese's argument on this point, nor that it either had a
substantial adverse effect upon the rights of Mr. Maese or that good
cause exists to arrest the Judgment or grant a new trial.
(b) Credibility of Mr. Maese
As to testimony a defendant may provide at trial, a prosecutor is
free to comment on credibility.

"When a defendant has testified during

trial, it is proper during a closing argument to comment on defendant's

The State further asserts that Heather T. had so testified at the earlier preliminary hearing
and that the official transcript of the trial is inaudible in parts at this point in the testimony as a
result of the emotional state of the witness. (State Memo in Opposition, p. 29.)
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State v. Jimenez, 21 P. 3d 1142 at 1145

(Utah Ct. App 2001) . See also, State v. Larsen, 2005 Utah App 201, ^ 14,
113 P.3d 998; State v. Parsons , 781 P.2d 1275, 1283-84

(Utah 1989);

United States v. Machuca-Barrera, 261 F.3d 425, 436 (5 th Cir. 2001) (A
prosecutor may assert a witness is not

credible if he supports his

assertion with admitted evidence.)
Here, the testimony Mr. Maese provided about regular "compliance"
meetings was contradicted by Mr. M^ese's own witnesses, who testified
that only two meetings were held.
the

(State Memo in Opp. p. 25.)

testimony from Ms. Curtis corroborated

meetings,

while

initially

held

on

a

Indeed,

the fact that compliance

regular

basis, were

disbanded

altogether because of concerns about scaring the escorts from engaging
in sex acts.

(Tr. Tl 72-80)

Clearly, there was a discrepancy between

Mr. Maese's testimony and the evidence presented by other witnesses, for
which the credibility of the testimony could be challenged.
Accordingly, Mr. Maese7 s Motion to Arrest Judgment and/or Motion for
new Trial is denied.
Sentencing of Mr. Maese is set for December 22, 2008, at noon.
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I hereby certify that I faxed and mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing Memorandum Decision and Order, to the following, this
*f> day of December, 2 008:

Chad L. Piatt
Deputy District Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
111 E. Broadway, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Fax No. 531-4137
D. Gilbert Athay
Attorney for Defendant
43 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Fax No. 364-3232
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THE STATE OF UTAH,

LAKE, SI,-.n: OFUTAH

Screened by: C. Piatt
Assigned to: C. Piatt

Plaintiff,
BAIL: PTS
Warrant/Release: Summons / Surrender
DAO# 6018158

-vsSTEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE,
DOB 12/06/76
AkaNONE
602-32-2315
2650 E. 3300 S. #5

AMENDED
INFORMATION

Defendant.
TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS,

Case No. 061906590

Co-Defendant.
The undersigned, Detective D. Bartlett - Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office, Agency Case
No 2006-28791, under oath states on information and belief that the defendant committed the
crimes of:
COUNT I
PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY, a Second Degree Felony, at 7567 S. 2160 East, and in
and around Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1603(3), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in
that the defendants, STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS, as
parties to the offense, attempted, conspired, solicited, requested, commanded, encouraged, or
intentionally aided another to participate as a principal in a pattern of unlawful activity intending
to receive directly or indirectly, proceeds derived from that pattern of unlawful activity to be
invested in the acquisition of an interest in the establishment or operation of an enterprise
contrary to Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1603(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, or
did acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, an interest in or control of an enterprise through a
pattern of unlawful activity contrary to Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1603(2), Utah Code
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Annotated, 1953 as amended, or did become persons employed by or associated with an
enterprise intending to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly in the functions of the
enterprise through a pattern of unlawful activity contrary to Title 76, Chapter 10, Section
1603(3), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, and committed an act or acts in the pursuance
of such attempt or conspiracy; to-wit: between the dates of July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006,
the defendants did exploit prostitution in at least three separate episodes which are not isolated,
but have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victim, or methods of commission, as
indicated in Counts TWO through FIVE of this Information.
NOTICE is given that the defendants' STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY
FRENCH CURTIS, interest in any property or proceeds from the conduct prohibited in Count I
is subject to forfeiture pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1603(5),
1953 as amended. NOTICE is further given pursuant to U.C.A. § 76-10-1603.5 that the district
attorney seeks the costs of investigating and prosecuting the offense described in Count I, to be
paid by defendant, in lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by law, and that the defendant be fined
not more than twice the amount of the net proceeds derived from the conduct engaged in and
prohibited by Section 76-10-1603.
COUNT II
EXPLOITATION OF PROSTITUTION, a Third Degree Felony, at 7567 S. 2160 East, and in
and around Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1305(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in
that the defendants, STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS, as
parties to the offense, owned, controlled, managed, supervised, or otherwise kept, alone or in
association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business; or procured an inmate
for a house of prostitution or placed one who would be an inmate in a house of prostitution; or
encouraged, induced or otherwise purposely caused another to become or remain a prostitute; or
transported, procured, or paid for transportation of a person into or within this state with a
purpose to promote that person's engaging in prostitution; or not being a child or legal dependent
of a prostitute, shared the proceeds of prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to an understanding
that she was to share therein.
COUNT III
EXPLOITATION OF PROSTITUTION, a Third Degree Felony, at 7567 S. 2160 East, and in
and around Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1305(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in
that the defendants, STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS, as
parties to the offense, owned, controlled, managed, supervised, or otherwise kept, alone or in
association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business; or procured an inmate
for a house of prostitution or placed one who would be an inmate in a house of prostitution; or
encouraged, induced or otherwise purposely caused another to become or remain a prostitute; or
transported, procured, or paid for transportation of a person into or within this state with a
purpose to promote that person's engaging in prostitution; or not being a child or legal dependent
of a prostitute, shared the proceeds of prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to an understanding
that she was to share therein.
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COUNT IV
EXPLOITATION OF PROSTITUTION, a Third Degree Felony, at 7567 S. 2160 East, and in
and around Salt Lake County. State of Utah, on or about July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1305(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in
that the defendants, STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS, as
parties to the offense, owned, controlled, managed, supervised, or otherwise kept, alone or in
association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business; or procured an inmate
for a house of prostitution or placed one who would be an inmate in a house of prostitution; or
encouraged, induced or otherwise purposely caused another to become or remain a prostitute; or
transported, procured, or paid for transportation of a person into or within this state with a
purpose to promote that person's engaging in prostitution; or not being a child or legal dependent
of a prostitute, shared the proceeds of prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to an understanding
that she was to share therein.
COUNT V
EXPLOITATION OF PROSTITUTION, a Third Degree Felony, at 7567 S. 2160 East, and in
and around Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, in
violation of Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1305(1), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in
that the defendants, STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS, as
parties to the offense, owned, controlled, managed, supervised, or otherwise kept, alone or in
association with another, a house of prostitution or a prostitution business; or procured an inmate
for a house of prostitution or placed one who would be an inmate in a house of prostitution; or
encouraged, induced or otherwise purposely caused another to become or remain a prostitute; or
transported, procured, or paid for transportation of a person into or within this state with a
purpose to promote that person's engaging in prostitution; or not being a child or legal dependent
of a prostitute, shared the proceeds of prostitution with a prostitute pursuant to an understanding
that she was to share therein.
COUNT VI
MONEY LAUNDERING, a Second Degree Felony, at 7567 S. 2160 East, and in and around
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or about July 1, 2004 through April 30, 2006, in violation of
Title 76, Chapter 10, Section 1903, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, in that the
defendants, STEVEN SANTIAGO MAESE and TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS, as party to
the offense, did transport, receive, or acquired property which was in fact proceeds of unlawful
activity, to wit: Exploitation of a Prostitute, knowing that the property involved represented the
proceeds of some form of unlawful activity, or made proceeds of unlawful activity available to
another by transaction or transportation, or other means, knowing that it was intended to be used
for the purpose of continuing or furthering the commission of specified unlawful activity.
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THIS INFORMATION IS BASED ON EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM THE FOLLOWING
WITNESSES:
Detective D. Bartlett; Sgt. Paul Brenneman; witnesses N.F., A.F., H.T., H.R., J.H., D.T.,
T.N., H.W., M.H.

PROBABLE CAUSE STATEMENT:
Your affiant bases this information on the following:
1.
D House LLC, aka "Doll House" is a registered sexually oriented business
("SOB") in Summit County, Park City. Doll House is not a registered SOB in any city within
Salt Lake County. The regiiered owners of D House LLC are TIFFANY FRENCH CURTIS
("CURTIS") and STEVEN SANTIAGO MEESE ("MEESE").
2.
In March of 2006, the Cottonwood Heights Precinct of the Salt Lake County
Sheriffs Office received complaints that the residence located at 7567 South 2160 East, in Salt
Lake County, was operating as an SOB, specifically, as the escort agency, Doll House.
3.
In March and April, 2006, Detective Dan Bartlett ("Bartlett") conducted trashcovers at 7567 S. 2160 East. In both instances Bartlett discovered discarded customer names,
addresses, and escort names on company letterhead, along with appointment dates and meeting
times, consistent with an SOB being operated without an SOB license.
4.
In an investigation based upon names obtained from the trash covers, as well as
the Doll House Web Site which contained a link to "theeroticreview.com" ("TER") - a website
that gives reviews of escorts, written by patrons. Bartlett discovered hundreds of reviews on TER
which describe specific sexual acts Doll House escorts have performed.
5.
Detective Bartlett conducted numerous interviews with current and past "escort"
employees of the Doll House. Each interviewee describes an ongoing pattern by which MEESE
and CURTIS aided and encouraged prostitution, and received the proceeds from the
appointments. A non-exhaustive description of MEESE and CURTIS' activities as related by
escorts follows:
a.
N.F., who worked as a Doll House escort between July and September of
2005 stated taht MEESE would tell her when a customer was a "reg" (a regular) and would
explain what likes the "reg" had, such as oral sex. N.F. describes one particular instance where
MEESE ordered her to an appointment where the customer wanted sex. N.F. tried not to have
sex, and the customer called MEESE to complain. MEESE then called N.F. and told her "B*tch,
you're gonna have to make it work." N.F. states when she attempted to leave Doll House,
MEESE threatened her. N.F. states she was not given many appointments because she would not
have sex with clients.
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b.
A.F., who worked as a Doll House escort between October and December
of 2005, states that MEESE threatened her if she did not continue working for Doll House. A.F.
states CURTIS regularly encouraged good reviews on TER, and specifically encouraged bbbj,
which is a term for oral sex without a condom. A.F. states that CURTIS made clear that if she
did not tip the phone girl, which was usually her self (the person that sets appointments), she
would not get any more appointments.
c.
H. r.„ who worked as a Doll House escort between January and March of
2006, states she did have sex with clients for money, and that she always paid CURTIS out at the
cottonwood address following the appointments. H.T. states for the first four appointments, the
entire $145.00 agency fee went to Doll House, plus 20% of any tips. H.T. states that not all
customers received intercourse - approximately 1 in 8, but that manual sex was frequent and
easy, approximately 7 in 8.
d.
H.R., who worked as a Doll House escort between September 2005 and
February 2006, states that she did have intercourse with clients for money, but usually provided
manual or oral sex because it was easy. H.R. states that MEESE and CURTIS told her that if she
ever got arrested for prostitution, to not say anything, and they would provide a lawyer for her.
e.
J.H., who worked as a Doll House escort between November and
December of 2005, states that MEESE told her they would pay for a lawyer if she would not talk
to police. J.H. states that money was paid out to CURTIS and/or MEESE at the Cottonwood
address every time. J.H. states that CURTIS told her that clients would ask for sex every time.
J.H. states that she did have sex with men for money, and would pay CURTIS 20% of the tips.
J.H. describes as an example one occasion being paid $1,000 for an appointment where she had
sex, paying out $100 for the "agency fee" and then an additional $200 to CURTIS as a tip.
f.
D.T., who worked as a Doll House escort between April and May of 2006,
states that she was sent on 3 to 4 dates per day in the beginning. D.T. states that she would have
sex for money while working for the Doll House. D.T. describes on one particular occasion
being asked by a customer to have sexual intercourse for $200.00 without a condom. When D.T.
refused, the customer called MEESE to complain. MEESE then got on the phone and told D.T.
to drive down the hill and get condoms and go back and ''work something out."
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g.
T.N., who worked as a Doll House escort for approximately one year
between 2005 and 2006, states that in practice the girls frequently told CURTIS and MEESE of
the specific sex acts they perform, and that they are required to tip 20% of the "tip" received by
customers to the call girl that sets the appointment, which was normally CURTIS. T.N. states
that CURTIS frequently called her and asked her to go to an appointment because the particular
customer wanted a specific sexual act which other girls are rptwilling to perform.

Affiant
Subscribed and sworn to before me this
day of October, 2006. * ^

MAGISTRATE
Authorized for presentment and filing:
DAVID E. YOCOM, DistripTAttorney

Deputy District Atterne;
October g ^ 2006
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